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Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria
09-115
Ruling Below: Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5321 (2010).
Plaintiffs, various business and civil-rights organizations, brought the actions against 15 county
attorneys of the state, the governor, the state Attorney General, the state registrar of contractors,
and the director of the state revenue department (collectively defendants). They alleged that the
Act was expressly and impliedly preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA). They also alleged that the Legal Arizona Workers Act (Act) violated
employers' rights to due process by denying them an opportunity to challenge the federal
determination of the work-authorization status of their employees before sanctions were
imposed. The district court held that the law was not preempted. The main argument on appeal
was that the law was expressly preempted by the federal immigration law provision preempting
state regulation other than through licensing and similar laws. The appellate court held that the
district court correctly determined that the Act was a licensing law within the meaning of the
federal provision, and therefore was not expressly preempted. The court also held that the Act
could and should be reasonably interpreted to allow employers, before any license could be
adversely affected, to present evidence to rebut the presumption that an employee was
unauthorized.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether an Arizona statute that imposes sanctions on employers who
hire unauthorized aliens is invalid under a federal statute that expressly "preempt[s] any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). (2) Whether the Arizona statute, which requires all employers to
participate in a federal electronic employment verification system, is preempted by a federal law
that specifically makes that system voluntary. (3) Whether the Arizona statute is impliedly
preempted because it undermines the "comprehensive scheme" that Congress created to regulate
the employment of aliens.
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC.; Somos America, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Arizona
Employers for Immigration Reform Inc. et al., Plaintiffs,
V.
Janet NAPOLITANO; Terry Goddard; Gale Garriott, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed September 17, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
This case is a facial challenge to an Arizona
state law, enacted in 2007 and aimed at
illegal immigration, that reflects rising
frustration with the United States Congress's
failure to enact comprehensive immigration
reform. The Arizona law, called the Legal
Arizona Workers Act, targets employers
who hire illegal aliens, and its principal
sanction is the revocation of state licenses to
do business in Arizona. It has yet to be
enforced against any employer.
Various business and civil-rights
organizations (collectively, "plaintiffs")
brought these actions against the fifteen
county attorneys of the state of Arizona, the
Governor of Arizona, the Arizona Attorney
General, the Arizona Registrar of
Contractors, and the Director of the
Department of Revenue of Arizona
(collectively, "defendants"). Plaintiffs allege
that the Legal Arizona Workers Act ("the
Act"), Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-211 to 23-216,
is expressly and impliedly preempted by the
federal Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-
1324b, and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996), codified in various sections of
8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. They also allege that
the Act violates employers' rights to due
process by denying them an opportunity to
challenge the federal determination of the
work-authorization status of their employees
before sanctions are imposed.
The district court held that the law was not
preempted. The main argument on appeal is
that the law is expressly preempted by the
federal immigration law provision
preempting state regulation "other than
through licensing and similar laws." The
district court correctly determined that the
Act was a "licensing" law within the
meaning of the federal provision and
therefore was not expressly preempted.
There is also a secondary, implied
preemption issue that principally relates to
the provision requiring employers to use the
electronic verification system now being
refined by the federal government as a tool
to check the work-authorization status of
employees through federal records. It is
known as E-Verify. Under current federal
immigration law, use of the system is
voluntary, and the Arizona law makes it
mandatory. We hold that such a requirement
to use the federal verification tool, for which
there is no substitute under development in
either the state, federal, or private sectors, is
not expressly or impliedly preempted by
federal policy.
Plaintiffs also contend that the statute does
not guarantee employers an opportunity to
be heard before their business licenses may
be revoked. The statute can and should be
reasonably interpreted to allow employers,
before any license can be adversely affected,
to present evidence to rebut the presumption
that an employee is unauthorized.
We uphold the statute in all respects against
this facial challenge, but we must observe
that it is brought against a blank factual
background of enforcement and outside the
context of any particular case. If and when
the statute is enforced, and the factual
background is developed, other challenges
to the Act as applied in any particular
instance or manner will not be controlled by
our decision.
Background
Sanctions for hiring unauthorized aliens
were first created at the federal level when
Congress passed IRCA in 1986. IRCA
prohibits knowingly or intentionally hiring
or continuing to employ an unauthorized
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alien, which it defines as an alien either not
lawfully admitted for permanent residence
or not authorized to be employed by IRCA
or the U.S. Attorney General.
IRCA also sets out the method of
demonstrating an employer's compliance
with the law through a paper-based method
of verifying an employee's eligibility,
known as the 1-9 system. It requires
employees to attest to their eligibility to
work and to present one of the specified
identity documents. IRCA then requires
employers to examine the identity document
the employee presents and attest that it
appears to be genuine. The employer is
entitled to a defense to sanctions if the
employer shows good-faith compliance with
the 1-9 system, unless the employer has
engaged in a pattern or practice of
violations.
The Attorney General is charged with
enforcing violations of IRCA. Hearings are
held before selected administrative law
judges ("ALJs"), and the ALJs' decisions
are reviewable by the federal courts.
IRCA contains an express preemption
provision, which states: "The provisions of
this section preempt any State or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other
than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer
for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens." The scope of the savings clause,
which permits state "licensing and similar
laws," is a critical issue in this appeal.
IRIRA directed the Attorney General to
establish three pilot programs to ensure
efficient and accurate verification of any
new employee's eligibility for employment.
One of these programs, the Basic Pilot
Program, was to be made available in at
least five of the seven states with the highest
estimated populations of aliens not lawfully
present in the United States. Congress
amended JIRIRA in 2002 by extending the
four-year period for the pilot programs to a
six-year period and again in 2003 by
extending the six-year period to an eleven-
year period. The Basic Pilot Program has
thus been extended until November 2008.
The Expansion Act also expanded the
availability of the Basic Pilot Program to all
fifty states.
The Basic Pilot Program, now known as E-
Verify, is an intemet-based system that
allows an employer to verify an employee's
work-authorization status. It is an alternative
to the 1-9 system. After an employer submits
a verification request for an employee, E-
Verify either issues a confirmation or a
tentative nonconfirmation of work-
authorization status. If a tentative
nonconfirmation is issued, the employer
must notify the employee, who has eight
days to challenge the finding. The employer
cannot take any adverse action against the
employee during that time. If an employee
does challenge the tentative
nonconfirmation, the employer will be
informed of the employee's final work-
authorization status. Any employee who
either does not challenge a tentative
nonconfirmation or is unsuccessful in
challenging a tentative nonconfirmation
must be terminated, or the employer must
notify the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") that it will continue to employ that
person. An employer who fails to notify
DHS of the continued employment of a
person who received a final nonconfirmation
is subject to a civil money penalty. An
employer who continues to employ a person
after receiving a final nonconfirmation is
subject to a rebuttable presumption that it
knowingly employed an unauthorized alien.
Against this federal backdrop, we turn to the
state law at issue here. Arizona enacted the
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Legal Arizona Workers Act on July 2, 2007,
with an effective date of January 1, 2008.
The Act allows the superior courts of
Arizona to suspend or revoke the business
licenses of employers who knowingly or
intentionally hire unauthorized aliens. Any
person may submit a complaint to the
Arizona Attorney General or a county
attorney. After determining a complaint is
not false or frivolous, the appropriate county
attorney is charged with bringing an action
against the employer in superior court. The
Act uses IRCA's definition of "unauthorized
alien." Additionally, the Act requires that
the court use the federal government's
determination of the employee's lawful
status.
The Act makes participation in E-Verify
mandatory for all employers, although it
provides no penalty for violation of the
requirement. The Act also includes an
affirmative defense for good-faith
compliance, explicitly incorporating IRCA.
The Act mandates a graduated series of
sanctions for violations. A first violation
requires the employer to terminate the
employment of all unauthorized aliens, file
quarterly reports of all new hires for a
probationary period, and file an affidavit
stating that it terminated all unauthorized
aliens and will not intentionally or
knowingly hire any others. A second
violation during the probationary period
results in the permanent revocation of the
employer's business license.
Plaintiffs originally filed an action
challenging the Act on July 13, 2007, less
than one month after the Act's enactment.
The district court dismissed the first action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because it did not name as defendants any of
Arizona's county attorneys, who have the
responsibility of enforcing the Act.
In December 2007, plaintiffs filed a second
complaint, this time including the Arizona
county attorneys as defendants. The
principal contentions were that the Act was
expressly preempted by federal law because
the Act was not a "licensing" or "similar"
law within the meaning of the savings clause
of IRCA's preemption provision; that, even
if the Act was not expressly preempted, it
was impliedly preempted because its
sanctions provisions and E-Verify
requirement conflict with federal law; and
that the Act violated employers' due process
rights because it did not allow them an
adequate opportunity to dispute the federal
government's response that an employee
was not authorized to work.
The matter proceeded to hearing, and the
district court dismissed the Arizona
Attorney General for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, because he lacks the authority
to bring enforcement actions. The court
ruled in favor of the remaining defendants
on the merits. It held that the Act is not
expressly preempted by IRCA because the
Act is a licensing law within the meaning of
the savings clause. It held that neither the
Act's sanctions provisions, nor the provision
mandating use of E-Verify, was inconsistent
with federal policy, and thus they were not
impliedly preempted. Finally, the court held
that the Act did not, on its face, violate due
process because employers' due process
rights were adequately protected. Plaintiffs
now appeal.
Discussion
I. Preemption
Federal preemption can be either express or
implied. When a federal statute contains an
explicit preemption provision, we are to
"'identify the domain expressly pre-empted'
by that language." IRCA contains an express
preemption clause in its provision creating
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sanctions for hiring unauthorized aliens. It
preempts all state sanctions "other than
through licensing and similar laws."
Plaintiffs contend that the Act is expressly
preempted.
Implied preemption has two subcategories.
The first is field preemption, where "the
depth and breadth of a congressional scheme
• occupies the legislative field." The
second is conflict preemption, which occurs
when either "compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," or where "state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." For conflict preemption to
apply, the conflict must be an actual
conflict, not merely a hypothetical or
potential conflict. Plaintiffs contend that
even if the entire Act is not expressly
preempted, the mandatory requirement to
use E-Verify is impliedly preempted
because it conflicts with the voluntary
program in IIRIRA.
A. The Act is not expressly preempted
because it falls within IRCA's savings
clause.
The explicit preemption provision in IRCA
states: "The provisions of this section
preempt any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a
fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."
The parties agree that the Act is expressly
preempted by IRCA unless it falls within the
savings clause of IRCA's express
preemption provision. Plaintiffs argue that
the Act does not fall within the savings
clause because they contend the Act is not a
"licensing law" within the ordinary meaning
of the phrase, and that the savings clause
was not intended to permit a state to create
an adjudication and enforcement system
independent of federal enforcement of IRCA
violations.
The district court held that the plain
language of section 1324a(h)(2) does not
facially preempt the Act because it does no
more than impose conditions on state
licenses to do business and thus falls within
the savings clause. The court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that section 1324a(h)(2)
permits only licensing sanctions that are
preceded by a federal adjudication of
employer liability, reasoning that neither the
plain language of section 1324a(h)(2) nor
the legislative history supports plaintiffs'
position.
The district court also rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the savings clause should be
interpreted narrowly, holding that because
regulation in the employment field is
traditionally an area of state concern, there is
a presumption against preemption. An issue
central to our preemption analysis is thus
whether the subject matter of the state law is
in an area of traditionally state or federal
presence. When Congress legislates "in a
field which the States have traditionally
occupied, . . . we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Conversely, we do
not assume non-preemption "when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a
history of significant federal presence."
... We conclude that, because the power to
regulate the employment of unauthorized
aliens remains within the states' historic
police powers, an assumption of non-
preemption applies here.
Plaintiffs contend that the term "license"
was intended to encompass only licenses to
engage in specific professions, such as
medicine or law, and not licenses to conduct
business. There is no support for such an
interpretation. "Licensing" generally refers
to "[a] governmental body's process of
issuing a license," and a "license" is "a
permission, usually revocable, to commit
some act that would otherwise be unlawful."
The Act provides for the suspension of
employers' licenses to do business in the
state. Such licenses are defined as "any
agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter or similar form of
authorization that is required by law and that
is issued by any agency for the purposes of
operating a business in this state." The
statute's broad definition of "license" is in
line with the terms traditionally used and
falls within the savings clause. The language
of the savings clause therefore exempts such
state licensing regulation from express
preemption. A recent district court case that
considered the same issue reached the same
conclusion.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the
legislative history demonstrates that
Congress intended the savings clause to
permit states to impose a state sanction only
after there had been a federal determination
of an alien's unauthorized status. Plaintiffs
rely on the second sentence in a paragraph
from Part I of House Report 99-682....
As the district court found, however, this
paragraph as a whole does not support
plaintiffs' argument. The paragraph
describes the federal law as preempting
"civil fines and/or criminal sanctions,"
neither of which the Act imposes. The
paragraph does not suggest that the federal
law would preempt local laws that suspend
or revoke licenses on the basis of IRCA
violations, or state licensing laws that
require employers not to hire unauthorized
workers....
In sum, the Act does not attempt to define
who is eligible or ineligible to work under
our immigration laws. It is premised on
enforcement of federal standards as
embodied in federal immigration law. The
district court therefore correctly held that the
Act is a "licensing" measure that falls within
the savings clause of IRCA's preemption
provision.
Plaintiffs finally contend that this kind of
state regulation must be preempted because
there is a potential for conflict in the
practical operation of the state and federal
law. They point to a hypothetical situation in
which an employer may be subject to
conflicting rulings from state and federal
tribunals on the basis of the same hiring
situation. Whether principles of comity or
issue preclusion would allow such a result
are questions not addressed by the parties. In
any event, a speculative, hypothetical
possibility does not provide an adequate
basis to sustain a facial challenge.
B. The Act's provision mandating the use of
E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by
federal law.
Plaintiffs argue that the Arizona provision
mandating the use of E-Verify is impliedly
preempted because it conflicts with
Congressional intent to keep the use
voluntary. They contend that Congress
wanted to develop a reliable and non-
burdensome system of work-authorization
verification, and that mandatory use of E-
Verify impedes that purpose. They rely on
the Supreme Court's decision in Geier v.
Am. Honda Motor Co. Geier recognized
that state laws that fall within a savings
clause and are therefore not expressly
preempted are still subject to the "ordinary
working of conflict pre-emption principles."
A state law is preempted through conflict
preemption when it "stands as an obstacle to
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the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Geier involved a Department of
Transportation regulation that was designed
to encourage competition among automobile
manufacturers to design effective and
convenient passive-restraint systems. The
regulation required only 10% of a car
manufacturer's production to include
airbags. The Court in Geier held that state
tort law, permitting liability to be imposed
for failure to provide airbags, conflicted
with the federal policy to encourage
development of different restraint systems.
The district court here held that Arizona's
requirement that employers use E-Verify
was not preempted because, while Congress
made participation in E-Verify voluntary at
the national level, that did not in and of itself
indicate that Congress intended to prevent
states from making participation mandatory.
We agree with that holding. Congress could
have, but did not, expressly forbid state laws
from requiring E-Verify participation. It
certainly knew how to do so because, at the
same time, it did expressly forbid "any State
or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and
similar laws) upon those who employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens."
Furthermore, this case is unlike Geier,
where the Supreme Court found strong
evidence of Congress's intent to promote
competition and balance federal goals in a
competitive environment encouraging
alternative systems. Here, E-Verify is a
federal government service that Congress
has implicitly strongly encouraged by
expanding its duration and its availability (to
all fifty states). Though Congress did not
mandate E-Verify, Congress plainly
envisioned and endorsed an increase in its
usage. The Act's requirement that employers
participate in E-Veify is consistent with and
furthers this purpose, and thus does not raise
conflict preemption concerns.
Appellants contend that conflict preemption
is a concern here also because of the Act's
potentially discriminatory effects. Their
argument is that E-Verify increases
discrimination against workers who look or
sound "foreign," and that mandatory E-
Verify usage thus upsets the enforcement/
discrimination balance that Congress has
maintained by keeping E-Verify optional.
This argument fails because Congress
requires employers to use either E-Verify or
1-9, and appellants have not shown that E-
Verify results in any greater discrimination
than 1-9.
II. Due Process
The deprivation of a property interest must
"be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case." An Arizona business license is a
property interest. An opportunity to be heard
must be "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." Employers thus should
be given an opportunity to be heard before
their business licenses are suspended or
revoked under the Act.
The Act sets forth the procedures to be
followed in bringing an enforcement action.
Any person may submit a complaint about a
suspected violation to either the Arizona
Attorney General or a county attorney. The
Attorney General or county attorney
investigating a complaint must verify the
alleged unauthorized alien's work-
authorization status with the federal
government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373; the
state official is prohibited from attempting to
make an independent determination of the
alien's status. After a complaint is
investigated and found not to be false or
frivolous, a county attorney must bring an
enforcement action against the employer in
state court in the county in which the alien
was employed. The court is to expedite the
action, which includes scheduling the
hearing as quickly as is practicable.
Plaintiffs contend, in this facial challenge,
that the Act violates due process because it
deprives employers of their business
licenses without providing them an adequate
opportunity to dispute whether an employee
was authorized to work. Plaintiffs rely on
the first sentence of subsection (H) to argue
that the Act prohibits employers at the state-
court hearing from presenting any evidence
to rebut the federal government's § 1373
response on the issue of the employee's
work status. Defendants, however, point to
the second sentence of subsection (H),
which provides that the federal response
creates only a rebuttable presumption. They
contend that the employer can rebut the
federal response with other evidence during
a hearing.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of subsection (H) is
flawed because it gives no meaning to the
second sentence of the provision. That
sentence at least implicitly contemplates a
hearing to rebut the presumption created by
the federal determination of an employee's
unauthorized status. Arizona law, consistent
with ordinary principles of statutory
interpretation, requires that "[e]ach word,
phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute]
must be given meaning so that no part will
be void, inert, redundant, or trivial." We
conclude that the statute provides an
employer the opportunity, during the state
court proceeding, to present rebuttal
evidence.
We therefore conclude that the district court
correctly determined that the Act provides
sufficient process to survive this facial
challenge. More importantly, the district
court also found that the statute does not
preclude the presentation of counterevidence
when an employer's liability is at issue and
we agree with this interpretation. An
employer's opportunity to present evidence
at a hearing in superior court, in order to
rebut the presumption of the employee's
unauthorized status, provides the employer a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before
sanctions are imposed. We conclude that
subsection (H) is facially constitutional.
The district
AFFIRMED.
court's judgment
"Court to Hear Challenge to Employer
Sanctions Law"
The Associated Press
June 28, 2010
Jacques Billeaud
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to hear an appeal from business and civil
rights groups trying to overturn a 2007
Arizona law that prohibits employers from
knowingly hiring illegal immigrants.
The state law was intended to lessen the
economic incentive for immigrants to sneak
into the U.S. by holding employers
accountable for hiring them.
The prohibition is separate from a new
Arizona immigration law that's also being
challenged in court and requires police to
question the immigration status of people
they suspect are in the country illegally.
Supporters say the employer sanctions law
was needed because the federal government
hasn't adequately enforced a similar federal
law.
Critics say the law is an unconstitutional
attempt by the state to regulate immigration
and that cracking down on illegal hires is the
sole responsibility of the federal
government.
Julie Pace, a lawyer representing the
business groups, said the object of the legal
challenge is to stop states from creating
differing immigration laws that make it
cumbersome for businesses that operate in
multiple states.
"This is not a path that is good for the
country," Pace said. "We need uniform
guidance for businesses so they can have a
legal supply of labor without having a
patchwork of laws across the country."
The state's employer sanctions law has been
upheld by a federal district court and the San
Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Businesses found to have knowingly hired
illegal immigrants can have their business
licenses suspended or revoked. The law also
requires employers to verify the work
eligibility of new workers through a federal
database.
Authorities across Arizona have examined
several dozen complaints of employer
sanctions violations since it went into effect
in Jan. 2008. So far, only two businesses-a
west Phoenix sandwich shop and a Glendale
amusement park-have entered settlements
in which they admit violating the law.
Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard,
whose office is defending the law in court,
said in a written statement that he expects
the court to find the law valid and
enforceable.
The Obama administration urged the high
court to prevent the state from enforcing the
state's employer sanctions law, arguing that
federal immigration law trumps state efforts.
The court's next term begins in October and
a decision is expected in the spring.
The case is Chamber of Commerce v.
Candelaria, 09-115.
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"Administration Opposes Arizona Law that Penalizes
Hiring of Illegal Immigrants"
The Washington Post
May 29, 2010
Robert Barnes
The Obama administration on Friday urged
the Supreme Court to review and set aside
an Arizona law that sanctions employers
who hire illegal immigrants, saying it would
disrupt the "careful balance" that Congress
struck in federal immigration law.
The act in question is not the strict new
Arizona law that President Obama and other
members of his administration have
criticized. That measure requires police to
question anyone who appears to be in the
country illegally.
The law being challenged, the Legal
Arizona Workers Act, imposes tougher
sanctions than federal law for hiring illegal
workers. If the court chooses to hear the
case, its ruling could show how receptive the
justices would be to arguments that
enforcing immigration laws is a federal
responsibility that cannot be usurped by the
states.
The Arizona act is being challenged by a
coalition of organizations that include the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Hispanic
groups and civil libertarians. Business
groups want to head off a proliferation of
conflicting state laws on employer sanctions,
while others worry that the penalties, which
include the loss of business licenses, would
discourage companies from hiring even
those legally in the country.
The administration, in a brief submitted by
Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal, said
federal law should preempt state efforts.
The Arizona law would "disrupt a careful
balance that Congress struck nearly 25 years
ago between two interests of the highest
importance: ensuring that employers do not
undermine enforcement of immigration laws
by hiring unauthorized workers, while also
ensuring that employers not discriminate
against racial and ethnic minorities legally in
the country," Katyal wrote.
The court asked the government in
November for its view of the case. The
response might have been delayed by two
factors. Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano is the state's former governor
and was the first defendant when the
challenge was filed. And Obama selected
Solicitor General Elena Kagan this month as
his choice to replace retiring Justice John
Paul Stevens.
Separately, Justice Department officials met
Friday in Phoenix with Arizona Attorney
General Terry Goddard and aides to Gov.
Jan Brewer (R) to express strong
reservations about the new law, which goes
into effect July 29. The administration fears
the law could lead to widespread racial
profiling.
The case the court is considering is
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria.
"Legal Arizona Workers Act Upheld"
HR Magazine
December 2008
Mary E. Pivec
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the
constitutionality of the Legal Arizona
Workers Act of 2007. The panel rejected the
plaintiffs' claims that the act violated the
supremacy and due process clauses of the
U.S. Constitution.
The Legal Arizona Workers Act, which took
effect Jan. 1, 2008, prohibits Arizona
employers from intentionally or knowingly
employing unauthorized aliens. The law
grants jurisdiction to the superior courts of
Arizona to hear complaints brought by
county attorneys to suspend or revoke the
business licenses of employers that violate
the law. The act also makes participation in
the federal E-Verify program, administered
by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), mandatory for all
employers, although it provides no penalty
for violating this requirement.
Civil rights groups and a business trade
group coalition challenged the law in two
separate actions, seeking injunctive relief to
prevent the act from taking effect. The
district court consolidated the two actions,
and in December 2007 dismissed the case
because the plaintiffs failed to sue the
appropriate defendants, but it also strongly
suggested that the plaintiffs' legal theories
lacked merit.
The plaintiffs quickly refiled their complaint
naming the proper defendants. Following an
expedited discovery, motion and hearing
schedule, the district court entered judgment
for the state defendants in February 2008,
holding:
- The Arizona Legal Workers Act was a
licensing law directed at protecting the jobs
of qualified U.S. workers, and it was legally
authorized under the savings clause of the
federal Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA).
- The state act's requirement that employers
participate in the federal E-Verify program
was not pre-empted by federal law.
• The Arizona statute can and should be
reasonably interpreted to preserve an
employer's due process rights to rebut a
federal determination that its workers were
undocumented prior to the revocation of a
state business license.
A 9th Circuit panel affirmed. It rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that Congress pre-
empted state regulation of employers for
employing undocumented workers under
IRCA. Congress carved out an exception to
federal pre-emption by authorizing the states
to exercise their licensing powers to protect
local workers from competition with
undocumented workers.
The 9th Circuit panel further rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that the Arizona act's
mandatory E-Verify provision conflicted
with federal law, which treats employer
participation as voluntary under the
administration of the DHS. The court
reasoned that because Congress did not
forbid the states from using the E-Verify
system to verify the immigration status of
state workers for purposes of effectuating a
licensing scheme, and because Congress had
otherwise strongly encouraged expansion of
the E-Verify system on a national level over
the years, there is no basis for declaring that
the Arizona scheme was pre-empted.
Finally, the panel rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the Arizona statute violates
the due process rights of employers by
mandating that the superior courts use the
federal government's determination of
immigration status in business license
revocation and suspension proceedings.
Because the act otherwise implicitly
provided employers with the right to a
hearing to present evidence to rebut the
presumption of unauthorized status under
the federal determination, the state hearing
procedure satisfied the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Professional Pointer
To date, more than 10 states have adopted
similar licensing schemes without legal
challenge. As a result of the 9th Circuit's
action, more states can be expected to adopt
such legislation.
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"Supreme Court to Consider Preemption
of Arizona Immigration Law"
Forbes
July 6, 2010
Victoria Pynchon
On the same day the controversial Arizona
Immigration Law went into effect, the
Supreme Court granted cert in Candelaria v.
Chamber of Commerce-a case that raises
the issue whether federal law preempts
Arizona's existing Legal Arizona Workers
Act ("LAWA"). That law-like its federal
counterpart the Immigration Reform and
Control Act ("IRAC")-prohibits employers
from hiring undocumented workers. Unlike
IRAC, the Arizona bill imposes a corporate
"death penalty" on any employer that twice
violates the Act's provisions, a penalty
Arizona lawmakers hoped would exempt the
Act from preemption by bringing it within a
"licensing" exception to IRAC's otherwise
exclusive provisions.
The Supreme Court's decision to hear this
case should be good news for employers
doing business in more than one state. As
the Reply Brief in support of the national
Chamber of Commerce's Petition for Cert
notes, employers are currently required to
keep abreast of hundreds of state laws
concerning the hiring of undocumented
workers, many of them requiring
inconsistent or duplicative proofs of legal
residency.
Arizona defends its right to regulate that
which the federal law already pervasively
addresses, by interpreting the term "license"
as including the ordinary documentation
every business must file to conduct its
affairs in any State-Articles of
Incorporation and the like. The federal trial
and appellate courts bought this rationale for
reasons that defy logic but make political
sense given the current anti-immigrant
climate in Arizona and other border states.
It's difficult to imagine, however, that the
Supreme Court will permit the licensing
exception to swallow the preemption rule in
this manner.
Because Arizona's right to regulate the
employment of undocumented workers rests
upon so spare a basis as the meaning of the
word "license," we cannot expect the high
court to decide the issue now burning up the
country's news wires-whether the recently
enacted Arizona immigration law will also
be preempted by its federal counterpart.
That law authorizes state and local law
enforcement officials to inquire into the
immigration status of any person who is
reasonably suspected of being unlawfully
present in the United States and to arrest
such an individual if there is probable cause
to do so. Back in April, Constitutional Law
Professor Steven L. Schwinn concluded that
the new immigration provision would be
preempted because the Arizona law falls
under the doctrines of both "field" and
"conflict" preemption.
As Schwinn wrote at the time,
The federal scheme reflects
Congress's judgment to completely
occupy the field of immigration and
naturalization ... a judgment that is
well within its powers under Article
I, Section 8.
Schwinn went on to argue that even if the
"field" theory did not invalidate the
489
controversial new Arizona legislation, the
doctrine of "direct conflict" would. As he
explained, the Arizona law authorizes state
authorities to arrest anyone the official
believes has committed a "public offense"
that "makes the person removable from the
United States." His conclusion? Because an
alien's "unauthorized presence in the United
States is just such an offense under 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1227 . . . Arizona's law is . . . in
conflict with the federal law and likely
violates the Supremacy Clause." Legal
opinions about the viability of the Arizona
law under preemption standards are,
however, all over the board, as most
comprehensively reported at The Volokh
Conspiracy's post "Is the Arizona
Immigration Law Preempted?"
Mayer Brown's Andrew Tauber in a June 28
article on the grant of cert, optimistically
suggests that the Supreme Court's decision
in Candelaria will illuminate the extent to
which states can impose their own work-
eligibility verification requirements, and
sanctions for hiring unauthorized workers,
on employers. Let's hope so. Given the
Court's recent propensity for deciding cases
of significance on hyper-technical grounds,
there is considerable danger that its opinion
will decide only the "safety clause" issue
and not the broader questions presented by
the new and far more controversial Arizona
immigration law. As Tauber notes, "[a]bsent
extensions, which are likely, amicus briefs
in [Candelaria that] support . . . the
petitioners will be due on August 19, 2010,
and [those] in support of the respondents
will be due on September 20, 2010.
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"Arizona Sanctions Law to Go
to U.S. Supreme Court"
The Arizona Republic
June 29, 2010
Craig Harris
The U.S. Supreme Court later this year will
hear arguments on the constitutionality of
Arizona's landmark 2007 law that penalizes
employers for hiring illegal immigrants. A
decision is expected next year.
The high court's ruling, expected in late
spring 2011, also could provide legal
guidance on SB 1070, a new Arizona law
making it a state crime to be in the country
illegally, those involved in the employer-
sanctions case say.
The court, following a request from the U.S.
solicitor general, announced Monday that it
will hear challenges to the Legal Arizona
Workers Act, which went into effect Jan. 1,
2008.
The law punishes companies by suspending
or revoking their business licenses for
knowingly hiring illegal immigrants. It also
requires Arizona employers to use a federal
electronic system to verify if an employee is
authorized to work.
The law was challenged by a coalition of 11
U.S. and Arizona business groups, which
contend that it is the federal government's
role to regulate the hiring of immigrants.
They argue that permitting states to impose
their own penalties against violators
encourages a crazy quilt of differing laws
that have penalties more severe than those in
federal statute and are less likely to be
balanced against discrimination concerns.
Supporters say the law has mostly been a
deterrent, as only two businesses have faced
sanctions.
Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has
used the law to conduct 36 investigations to
crack down on illegal immigrants. His
workforce raids have resulted in 415
suspects being arrested, with 277 arrested on
charges of identity theft.
"Everyone tends to forget the victims who
get their identities stolen and the devastation
that it has on the victims," said Chief
Deputy David Hendershott of the Sheriff's
Office. "Has it been effective? Look at what
has happened. There has been widespread
self-policing by major corporations and
businesses."
A U.S. District Court and the San Francisco-
based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had
upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's
employer-sanctions law.
The Arizona Attorney General's Office,
which did not return calls Monday, defeated
challenges by citing a 1986 federal law that
gave states permission to impose sanctions
through licensing and similar laws.
Arizona has allocated nearly $5.6 million to
the state's 15 county attorneys during the
past three years to enforce the law. Maricopa
County received the most: nearly $3.6
million.
This past fiscal year, the state gave money
only to Maricopa County after The Republic
reported at least $1.44 million was sitting
idle in nine counties because there were so
few complaints about employers violating
the law. For the new fiscal year, which
begins Thursday, the county is projected to
receive $1.21 million, bringing the state's
spending total to nearly $6.8 million.
The law has been mirrored in other states
and communities across the country. Both
sides of the lawsuit agree the Supreme
Court's ruling will give states some
guidance on an important aspect in the
illegal-immigration debate.
"This will give clarity as to the appropriate
role of states in regulating at least one aspect
of immigration," said Glenn Hamer, chief
executive of the Arizona Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, one of the suit's
plaintiffs.
Hendershott said the high court will let
everyone know what to do.
But Paul Bender, an Arizona State
University law professor and constitutional-
law expert, said the Supreme Court's ruling
on the employer-sanctions case could be
narrow, not providing much direction on SB
1070. Bender added that because the
employer-sanctions ruling won't come for
about a year, lower courts may have no
guidance, as rulings on the new law could
occur during that time.
The new law states that an officer engaged
in a lawful stop, detention or arrest shall,
when practicable, ask about a person's legal
status when reasonable suspicion exists that
the person is in the U.S. illegally.
The federal government is expected to file a
lawsuit soon challenging the SB 1070,
which goes into effect July 29.
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"Immigration Raids Often Start with
Tips from Disgruntled Employees"
Phoenix Business Journal
September 3, 2009
Mike Sunnucks
It often starts with a disgruntled current or
former employee calling a Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office tip line or a worker who has
gotten into legal trouble sharing information
on an employer.
The result can be dozens of armed MCSO
deputies raiding a business, shutting it down
for hours and arresting suspected
undocumented workers.
A 2007 state law, designed to suspend or the
revoke business licenses of employers who
knowingly hire undocumented workers, has
led to many employee arrests, but few
bosses or businesses have been charged.
Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has
raided 22 Phoenix-area businesses suspected
of hiring illegal immigrants since 2008.
Those resulted in 310 arrests on
immigration, fake identification and identify
theft charges.
The raids are welcomed by those who back
Arpaio's get-tough approach to illegal
immigration, but others question how the
sheriffs tactics and targeting people whose
only crime is illegally entering the U.S. for
work.
Arpaio says the raids are conducted under
the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act and a
federal 287(g) agreement, which allows the
MCSO to arrest illegal immigrants.
Arpaio said it is tough to prove businesses
knowingly hire illegal immigrants who show
fake IDs, but will arrest suspected workers
during the raids. "It's hard to hook the
employer," Arpaio said.
Maricopa County Attorney's Office
spokesman Michael Scerbo said the county
is investigating two managers at businesses
raided by the MCSO under the employer
sanctions law: a former supervisor with the
Golfland Entertainment Inc. water parks;
and Raphael Libardi, owner of Aracruz
International Granite, which imports and
sells granite and marble slabs and
countertops used in homes and commercial
buildings.
Libardi was indicted in July on charges of
illegally using the Social Security number of
deceased man.
"We are not interested and I have no
comment," said Ive Dummer Libardi Lopez
in response to a request for comment from
Aracruz Granite.
Officials at Golfland did not respond to a
request for comment.
Lock down
Arpaio said most of the business raids start
with a tip from a disgruntled current or
former employee who knows or suspects the
business in question is hiring illegal
immigrants. The MCSO has received more
than 5,000 such tips.
The MCSO then checks Social Security and
Arizona Department of Economic Security
databases for duplicates, after which search
warrants often are secured.
"We don't just knock the door down and
grab people cause they look like they are
from Mexico," Arpaio said.
Julie Pace, an immigration attorney with
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll LLP
who represents businesses, agreed that many
times disgruntled employees call the MCSO,
but added the sheriff s business
investigations also originate from other
sources.
"Sometimes MCSO's investigations arise
from a current employee who is arrested
based on a DUI or outstanding charge and
then is interviewed by MCSO about the
company and hiring practices and that can
cause an investigation," Pace said.
"Raids by MCSO have lots of officers and
search warrants that generally identify the
names of the individual employees-current
and former-whom they want to talk with,
search warrants identify documents such as
personnel files for the individuals' names on
the search warrant list," Pace said.
The MCSO gives no advance notice of the
raids and generally locks down the
operation. No phone calls, bathroom visits,
or even getting a drink of water are allowed.
Officers often cuff employees who they
arrest as being undocumented and detain
those who are legal as they check them out,
Pace said.
Arpaio said the raids require significant
number of officers to cordon off the area and
make sure suspects do not escape. "They are
always trying to escape," he said.
Some business owners privately
acknowledge they tell workers they know or
suspect of being undocumented to leave the
premises if they see MCSO deputies.
Informal communications "trees" also exist
among immigrant communities to notify
workers and others if there appears a raid
appears to be under way.
No apologies to critics
The MCSO has more than 160 officers
trained to enforce federal immigration laws.
Companies hit have included Royal Paper
Converting Co., Gold Canyon Candle and
Handyman Maintenance Inc. Several of the
companies subject to MCSO raids refused or
did not respond to requests for comment.
But the owner of a Scottsdale custom
furniture business where 12 people were
arrested in a January raid said the actions are
misguided.
"We are not interested in this fight because
we believe it is a lost out-of-control cause,"
said Jerry Martin, owner and manager of the
Scottsdale Art Factory which makes custom
furniture. "Due to the sheriff's egomaniacal
polices he assumes it is OK to use his office
to advance some personal cause, while hard
working business folks make up the very tax
base that allows him to exist try to survive in
this economy."
The MCSO raid on the Scottsdale business
involved 45 officers. Arpaio makes no
apologies for the number of deputies used in
the raids saying they need to be prepared for
various situations. He also makes no
apologies for enforcing immigration laws
and said investigations sometimes take
months to develop.
"We need to have probable cause," the
sheriff said.
The U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency also can conduct raids
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against businesses hiring undocumented
workers. The waning days of the Bush
administration saw some increased activity
on that front, including threats of
prosecution. The Obama administration has
promised to step up such investigations.
U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano said earlier this summer the
administration wants to rework 287(g) pacts
with local police, including the MCSO, to
focus more criminal activity. Arpaio said he
believes the MCSO and ICE will work out a
new agreement.
Pace said businesses should audit 1-9 forms,
which list employees' identification
information and legal status. Companies
should have workers sign forms further
testifying they are legal to work in the U.S.
and use the federal E-Verify database
system to help determine workers' status.
The business raids are part of Arpaio's hard-
line approach to illegal immigration,
including crime sweeps and raids at day
labor sites where undocumented migrant
workers congregate. The U.S. Department of
Justice is looking at whether such tactics
unfairly target Hispanics and there are a
couple of lawsuits against the sheriff filed
by Hispanics caught in raids.
A Hispanic father and son are suing Arpaio
in U.S. District Court claiming they were
unlawfully detained in a February raid
against a Phoenix landscaping business. The
American Civil Liberties Union filed the suit
on behalf of Julian Mora, 66, and Julio
Mora, 19. The senior Mora is a legal
resident of the U.S. and his son is a U.S.
citizen, according to the lawsuit.
The Moras claim MCSO officers pulled
them over on a Phoenix street in February,
arrested them and transported them to the
site of a raid on Phoenix landscaping
business Handyman Maintenance Inc. Julian
Mora was an employee of HMI at the time
of the raid.
The suit claims the Moras were unfairly
arrested because they look Hispanic. The
pair were detained by deputies at HMI for
three hours before being released. Fifty-nine
immigrant workers were arrested.
The ACLU also is party to a federal lawsuit
against the MCSO brought by a Mexican
national who says he is in the U.S. legally.
Melendres v. Arpaio involves MCSO's
treatment of Manuel De Jesus Ortega
Melendres in 2007 in Cave Creek. Arpaio
says the DOJ investigation and lawsuits are
being pushed those who don't like his
immigration enforcement.
Immigration Raids
Raids on businesses by the Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office and number of alleged
illegal immigrants detained:
Golfland Entertainment
(Waterworld/SunSplash): 20
Artistic Land Management: 31
Gold Canyon Candle: 60
Management Cleaning Control:6
Scottsdale Art Factory: 12
Handyman Maintenance Inc.: 59
Cochran Painting: 8
Lindstrom Family Car Wash: 14
Royal Paper: 47
"Maricopa County Prosecutors File
First Employer Sanctions Case"
The Arizona Republic
November 19, 2009
JJ Hensley & Michael Kiefer
Nearly two years and 26 business raids after
the state's employer-sanctions law took
effect, county prosecutors on Wednesday
filed the first case against a business owner
they say knowingly hired illegal workers.
Michelle Hardas, owner of Scottsdale Art
Factory, has been named in a civil complaint
in Maricopa County Superior Court.
The complaint alleges she knowingly
violated the Legal Arizona Workers Act
when, according to prosecutors, she hired a
subcontractor who was actually her
employee and whom she knew to be in the
country illegally.
"It's the first time a case like this has been
brought any place in the United States,"
County Attorney Andrew Thomas said. "It's
the first time a state law has been used to try
to suspend or revoke a business license of an
employer who had hired illegal immigrants."
In the suit, the County Attorney's Office
asks that any illegal workers be fired and
that the company's business license be
suspended for at least 10 days. A hearing is
scheduled for next week.
Hardas denies any wrongdoing.
The case focuses on a Mexican national
named Hilario Santiago Hernandez, who
was arrested during a Jan. 29 immigration
raid by sheriffs deputies at Scottsdale Art
Factory, a custom-furniture and cabinet
business on Greenway Road.
Acting on a tip
Santiago Hernandez was voluntarily
deported. But, according to the court filing,
he was back in Phoenix by April and filed
paperwork with the Arizona Corporation
Commission to start a company called
Santiago Homemade Furniture.
Investigators believe he and Hardas then
tried to sidestep the employer-sanctions law
by claiming Santiago Hernandez was an
independent contractor and not a full-time
employee, because the law does not hold
general contractors responsible for verifying
the legal status of a subcontractor's
employees.
Acting on a tip, investigators sent another
man to the Scottsdale Art Factory to act as if
he were seeking work.
That man was wired with an undercover
video camera, and he recorded Hardas as she
counseled him-in Santiago Hernandez's
presence-on how to set up his own
company, file the paperwork and pay the
taxes.
Hardas said Wednesday that the paperwork
for Santiago Hernandez was in order but that
she was not in the position to check the
status of employees at Santiago Homemade
Furniture.
Hardas added that she used E-Verify to
confirm the status of employees Scottsdale
Art Factory hired since the January raid.
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"Absolutely, every employee that we have
hired has been E-Verify," she said. "There
has been no question."
Scottsdale Art Factory registered with the
Corporation Commission in 1997, and
investigators believe there are fewer than 20
employees.
The Legal Arizona Workers Act was
designed to help law enforcement target
business owners instead of the employees
typically ensnared during workplace raids.
When the law took effect on Jan. 1, 2008, it
followed months of debate about the impact
the measure would have on the state's
economy and a legal challenge that was
ultimately rejected in federal court, though
the U.S. Supreme Court could still consider
the challenge this year.
And then nothing.
There were more than two dozen raids that
netted 327 arrests, but none of the busts
resulted in charges against employers, which
law-enforcement officials blamed on
provisions in the law requiring prosecutors
to prove business owners had knowingly
hired an illegal immigrant after the law went
into effect.
Thomas has said the law is weak, and he
wants the Legislature to consider
strengthening the powers of investigators
with the ability to subpoena business
records.
Proving intent
As written, the law requires investigators to
spend months comparing employee files
with data from the Department of Economic
Security, but the comparison does little to
help prove the intent of the business owner
when the worker was hired.
A ruling against Hardas could result in the
suspension of Scottsdale Art Factory's
business license for 10 days; another
violation within a year would mean the loss
of a business license.
Either would be a victory for Thomas and
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who have consistently
tried to deflect the perception that the
employer-sanctions law is just another
method to target illegal immigrants.
"It's an important day, not only in Arizona
but nationally, and we thought it was
important that we try to do it right, and I
believe we have," Thomas said.
Those undercover recordings and Hardas'
version of events should end up in court
soon.
Shortly after the Legal Arizona Workers Act
was passed, the state Legislature also passed
laws to ensure that such cases would be fast-
tracked. The Scottsdale Art Factory case has
a hearing set for next Wednesday before
Superior Court Judge Sam Myers, and the
company will be expected to have an
attorney by that date.
The tapes will be a key piece of evidence.
"It's like having a real business . . . even
though we're just using it to put the money
through," Hardas is heard saying on the
video recording.
But she also states that she worries about
what other company employees will think
because "maybe somebody doesn't like the
fact that I'm hiring you guys and trying to
get around the system."
Her fear turned out to be well-founded.
On the recording, Hardas worries that if the
sheriffs deputies return, those employees
might say the undocumented workers are
there every day.
She then counsels the undercover job
applicant to say that he is a subcontractor
and just comes in occasionally to drop off
work.
When reached for comment, Santiago
Hernandez said that he no longer works for
Scottsdale Art Factory but that he was an
employee there about three years ago. He
admitted he has a company called Santiago
Furniture but claimed he no longer does
business with Hardas. He declined to answer
if he was in the country illegally.
Santiago Hernandez also said that he knew
nothing about the civil lawsuit filed against
Hardas.
Thomas said he does not believe Hardas is
the only business owner violating the law.
"It is an attempt to game the system," he
said. "But we held this company
accountable today, and it's an important step
forward to fight illegal immigration."
Flores- Villar v. United States
09-5801
Ruling Below: United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
Flores-Villar v. United States, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2743 (2010).
Appellant challenges two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which consider the
transmission of citizenship from a citizen parent to a child born out of wedlock where the second
parent is not a citizen and the child is born outside of the United States. These sections impose
different standards based on whether the citizen parent is male or female. If the citizen parent is
male, then he must have resided in the United States continuously for five years after attaining
the age of fourteen for his citizenship to pass to the child. If the citizen parent is female,
however, she must have resided in the United States for a period of only one year for her
citizenship to pass to the child. The Court has previously recognized two important state interests
that are substantially furthered by these sections: assuring (1) that a biological parent-child
relationship exists and (2) that a "real, every-day" parent-child relationship exists. The lower
court held that these relationships are more readily established with regard to the mother than the
father. The lower court also held that a more lenient stance with regard to citizen mothers is
important because it helps to avoid the problem of "stateless" children born without any
citizenship in foreign countries that recognize citizen status based on bloodline as opposed to
place of birth.
Question Presented: Whether the Court's decision in Nguyen v. INS
discrimination that has no biological basis.
permits gender
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
RUBEN FLORES-VILLAR, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 6, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
RYMER, Circuit Judge:
Ruben Flores-Villar raises a challenge under
the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause on the
basis of age and gender to two former
sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1401(a)(7) and 1409 (1974),
which impose a five-year residence
requirement, after the age of fourteen, on
United States citizen fathers-but not on
United States citizen mothers-before they
may transmit citizenship to a child born out
of wedlock abroad to a non-citizen. This
precise question has not been addressed
before, but the answer follows from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Nguyen v. INS,
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533 U.S. 53 (2001). There the Court held
that 1409's legitimation requirements for
citizen fathers, but not for citizen mothers,
did not offend principles of equal protection.
Assuming, as the Court did in Nguyen, that
intermediate scrutiny applies to Flores-
Villar's gender-based claim and rational
basis review applies to his age-based claim,
we conclude that the residence requirements
of 1401(a)(7) and 1409 survive. As this is
what the district court held in a published
opinion, United States v. Flores- Villar, 497
F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Cal. 2007), and we
see no other error, we affirm.
I
Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana, Mexico
on October 7, 1974 to Ruben Trinidad
Floresvillar-Sandez, his United States
citizen biological father who was sixteen at
the time, and Maria Mercedes Negrete, his
non-United States citizen biological mother.
Floresvillar-Sandez had been issued a
Certificate of Citizenship on May 24, 1999
based on the fact that his mother-Flores
Villar's paternal grandmother-is a United
States citizen by birth.
His father and grandmother brought Flores-
Villar to the United States for medical
treatment when he was two months old. He
grew up in San Diego with his grandmother
and father. Floresvillar-Sandez is not listed
on Flores-Villar's birth certificate, but he
acknowledged Flores-Villar as his son by
filing an acknowledgment of paternity with
the Civil Registry in Mexico on June 2,
1985.
On March 17, 1997 Flores-Villar was
convicted of importation of marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 952 and 960; and on
June 16, 2003 he was convicted of two
counts of illegal entry into the United States
in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325. He was
removed from the United States pursuant to
removal orders on numerous occasions:
October 16, 1998, April 16, 1999, June 4,
1999, June 4, 2002, October 20, 2003, and
March 28, 2005.
He was arrested again on February 24, 2006,
and this time was charged with being a
deported alien found in the United States
after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C.
1326(a) and (b). He sought to defend on the
footing that he believed he was a United
States citizen through his father. Meanwhile,
Flores-Villar filed an N-600 application
seeking a Certificate of Citizenship, which
was denied on the ground that it was
physically impossible for his father, who
was sixteen when Flores-Villar was born, to
have been present in the United States for
five years after his fourteenth birthday as
required by 1401(a)(7). The government
filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of derivative citizenship for the same reason,
which the district court granted. The court
denied Flores-Villar's corresponding motion
in limine, to be allowed to present evidence
that he believed he was a United States
citizen.
The district court found Flores-Villar guilty
following a bench trial on stipulated facts. It
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.
Flores-Villar timely appeals his conviction.
1I
When Flores-Villar was born, 1401(a)(7)
provided, in relevant part:
(a) The following shall be nationals
and citizens of the United States at
birth:
(7) a person born outside the
geographic limits of the United
States and its outlying possessions of
parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United
States who, prior to the birth of such
person, was physically present in the
United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods
totaling not less than ten years, at
least five of which were after
attaining the age of fourteen years.
Section 1409 provided:
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (3)
to (5) and (7) of section 1401(a) of
this title, and of paragraph (2) of
section 1408, of this title shall apply
as of the date of birth to a child born
out of wedlock... if the paternity of
such child is established while such
child is under the age of twenty-one
years by legitimation.
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of
subsection (a) of this section, a
person born . . . outside the United
States and out of wedlock shall be
held to have acquired at birth the
nationality status of his mother, if the
mother had the nationality of the
United States at the time of such
person's birth, and if the mother had
previously been physically present in
the United States or one of its
outlying possessions for a continuous
period of one year.
Thus, if a United States citizen father had a
child out of wedlock abroad, with a non-
United States citizen mother, the father must
have resided in the United States for at least
five years after his fourteenth birthday to
confer citizenship on his child. But a United
States citizen mother had to reside in the
United States for a continuous period of
only one year prior to the child's birth to
pass on citizenship. It is this difference that
Flores-Villar claims makes an impermissible
classification on the basis of gender and age.
In Nguyen, the United States citizen father
of a child born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese
mother challenged 1409's imposition of
different rules for obtaining citizenship
depending upon whether the one parent with
American citizenship is the mother or the
father. There, the father complained about
the affirmative steps a citizen father, but not
a citizen mother, was required by 1409(a)(4)
to take: legitimation; a declaration of
paternity under oath by the father; or a court
order of paternity. Assuming, without
deciding, that the intermediate level of
scrutiny normally applied to a gender-based
classification applies even when the statute
is within Congress' immigration and
naturalization power, and drawing on Justice
Stevens's prior opinion in Miller v. Albright,
the Court identified two important
governmental interests substantially
furthered by 1409's distinction between
citizen fathers and citizen mothers. The first
is "assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists." Mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated in this respect; the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself in
the case of the mother, while a father's
biological relationship to the child is not so
easily established. The second interest is
ensuring "that the child and the citizen
parent have some demonstrated opportunity
or potential to develop not just a relationship
that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the
law, but one that consists of the real,
everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in
turn, the United States." The mother knows
that the child is in being and has immediate
contact at birth such that an opportunity for
a meaningful relationship exists, whereas, as
the Court put it, "[t]he same opportunity
does not result from the event of birth, as a
matter of biological inevitability, in the case
of the unwed father." Unlike an unwed
mother, there is no assurance that the father
and his biological child will ever meet, or
have the kind of contact from which there is
a chance for a meaningful relationship to
develop. The Court emphasized that
Congress need not ignore these realities for
purposes of equal protection, and found that
the means chosen-additional requirements
for an unwed citizen father to confer
citizenship upon his child-are substantially
related to the objective of a relationship
between parent and child, and in turn, the
United States.
Although the means at issue are different in
this case-an additional residence
requirement for the unwed citizen father-
the government's interests are no less
important, and the particular means no less
substantially related to those objectives, than
in Nguyen. The government argues that
avoiding stateless children is an important
objective that is substantially furthered by
relaxing the residence requirement for
women because many countries confer
citizenship based on bloodline (jus
sanguinis) rather than, as the United States
does, on place of birth (jus soli). We
explained the conundrum in Runnett v.
Shultz:
"One obvious rational basis for a
more lenient policy towards
illegitimate children of U.S. citizen
mothers is that illegitimate children
are more likely to be "stateless" at
birth.... As the government notes, if
the U.S. citizen mother is not a dual
national, and the illegitimate child is
born in a country that does not
recognize citizenship by jus soli
(citizenship determined by place of
birth) alone, the child can acquire no
citizenship other than his mother's at
birth. This policy clearly
demonstrates a "rational basis" for
Congress' more lenient policy
towards illegitimate children born
abroad to U.S. citizen mothers."
While Flores-Villar points out that the
opposite would be true in Iran, for example,
where an illegitimate child born to an
Iranian mother and a father who is not an
Iranian citizen is regarded as having the
father's nationality, this does not diminish
the strength of Congress' interest in trying to
minimize the risk of statelessness overall.
As the Supreme Court remarked in a
different context, statelessness is a deplored
condition with potentially "disastrous
consequences." In any event, as Nguyen
makes clear, we do not expect statutory
classifications always to be able to achieve
the ultimate objective.
Avoiding statelessness, and assuring a link
between an unwed citizen father, and this
country, to a child bom out of wedlock
abroad who is to be a citizen, are important
interests. The means chosen substantially
further the objectives. Though the fit is not
perfect, it is sufficiently persuasive in light
of the virtually plenary power that Congress
has to legislate in the area of immigration
and citizenship....
Flores-Villar acknowledges that the
prevention of stateless children is a
legitimate goal, but contends that it cannot
be furthered by penalizing fathers. In his
view, the real purpose of the statute is to
perpetuate the stereotypical notion that
women should have custody of illegitimate
children. Further, he suggests, the length of
residence in the United States says nothing
about the father-child relationship or the
biological basis of that relationship. And
understandably, Flores-Villar emphasizes
that his father in fact had a custodial
relationship with him. However, the Court
rejected similar submissions by the father in
Nguyen. As it explained:
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"This line of argument misconceives
the nature of both the governmental
interest at issue and the manner in
which we examine statutes alleged to
violate equal protection. As to the
former, Congress would of course be
entitled to advance the interest of
ensuring an actual, meaningful
relationship in every case before
citizenship is conferred. Or Congress
could excuse compliance with the
formal requirements when an actual
father-child relationship is proved. It
did neither here, perhaps because of
the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and
difficulties of proof that might attend
an inquiry into any particular bond or
tie. Instead, Congress enacted an
easily administered scheme to
promote the different but still
substantial interest of ensuring at
least an opportunity for a parent-
child relationship to develop.
Petitioners' argument confuses the
means and ends of the equal
protection inquiry; 1409(a)(4) should
not be invalidated because Congress
elected to advance an interest that is
less demanding to satisfy than some
other alternative."
The residence differential is directly related
to statelessness; the one-year period
applicable to unwed citizen mothers seeks to
insure that the child will have a nationality
at birth. Likewise, it furthers the objective of
developing a tie between the child, his or her
father, and this country. Accordingly, we
conclude that even if intermediate scrutiny
applies, 140 l(a)(7) and 1409 survive.
Sections 1401(a)(7) and 1409 satisfy
rational basis review as well. Legislation is
presumed valid, and "will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." Having passed intermediate
scrutiny, the statutory scheme necessarily is
rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. This follows from Runnett. There
we held that it was rational to adopt a more
lenient policy for illegitimate children of
United States citizen mothers who satisfied a
residence requirement than for legitimate
children whose mothers failed to meet a
higher residency requirement.
AFFIRMED.
"Justices to Weigh Law on Gaining
Citizenship via Parents"
The New York Times
March 22, 2010
Adam Liptak
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
decide if mothers and fathers may be treated
differently in determining whether their
children may claim American citizenship.
The case[,Flores-Villar v. United States,]
involves Ruben Flores-Villar, who was born
in Tijuana, Mexico, but was raised by his
father and grandmother, both American
citizens, in San Diego. His mother was
Mexican, and his parents were not married.
Mr. Flores-Villar tried to avoid deportation
by claiming American citizenship. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in San Francisco, rejected that claim
under a law that spelled out different
requirements for mothers and fathers whose
children were born abroad and out of
wedlock to a partner who was not an
American citizen.
The law, since amended, allowed fathers to
transmit citizenship to their children only if
the fathers had lived in the United States
before the child was born for a total of 10
years, five of them after age 14. Mothers
were required to have lived in the United
States for a year before their child was born.
(The amended law kept the general system
but shortened the residency requirement for
fathers.)
Mr. Flores-Villar's father was 16 when his
son was born, making it impossible for him
to fulfill the part of the law requiring five
years of residency after age 14.
Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the differing
treatments violated equal protection
principles. The Supreme Court has said that
sex-based classifications are permissible
only if they serve important governmental
goals and are substantially related to
achieving those goals.
In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld a law
that imposed differing requirements in a
similar situation. In that case, Nguyen v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, a
closely divided court said that American
fathers of children born out of wedlock
abroad had to get a court order establishing
paternity or swear to it under oath for their
children to obtain American citizenship.
American mothers were not subject to that
requirement.
Mr. Flores-Villar said that decision turned
on biological factors concerning the
establishment of paternity that are not
present in his case, Flores-Villar v. United
States, No. 09-5801.
"Should Immigration Law Favor Children of US
Mothers, Over US Fathers?"
Visa Lawyer Blog
April 13, 2010
Jacob Sapochnick
A great program on KPBS this morning
covered the case of Ruben Flores-Villar.
Flores-Villar, 35, was born in Tijuana,
Mexico, but grew up in the San Diego area,
in the care of his father and grandmother.
[The case is Flores- Villar v. United States.]
When he sought U.S. citizenship in 2006-
to fend off criminal charges of being in the
country illegally-U.S. immigration
authorities turned him down. For people
born before 1986, their U.S. citizen fathers
had to have lived in the U.S. for 10 years, at
least five of them after the age of 14. Flores-
Villar's father could not meet the second
part of that requirement because he was only
16 when his son was born. American
mothers need only have lived in the U.S.
continuously for a year before the birth of a
child.
Later this year, the Supreme Court will enter
a curious corner of U.S. immigration law
that applies only to children born outside the
U.S. to one parent who is an American and
one who is not. The law makes it easier for
children whose mother is a citizen to
become citizens themselves. Even after
reform legislation in 1986, children of
American fathers face higher hurdles
claiming citizenship for themselves.
Lower federal courts upheld Flores-Villar's
conviction and rejected his discrimination
claims. Flores-Villar has previously been
deported at least five times since he was
convicted of importing marijuana when he
was 22, the government said in court papers.
The Obama administration argued that the
less stringent residency requirement in the
1986 law was one of several reasons for the
court to stay out of the case.
The 1986 Citizenship law states:
Children born abroad to two US citizen
parents, one of whom has resided in the US
prior to the birth of the child, continue to be
US citizens at birth, and need take no special
actions to retain citizenship.
Children born to one citizen parent and one
foreign national will obtain citizenship at
birth if the citizen parent resided in the US
for five years before the birth, with two of
those years after the age of 14. The child
does not need to take any special action to
retain US citizenship.
Children born out of wedlock to a US citizen
mother will be US citizens if the mother
resided in the US for one year prior to the
birth of the child. Children born out of
wedlock to a US citizen father will acquire
US citizenship if the following conditions
are met:
There is
relationship
the child,
an established blood
between the father and
The father was a US citizen at the
time of the birth,
The father has agreed to financially
support the child until it is 18, and
Before the child is 18 it is
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legitimated, or the father
acknowledges paternity in a
document signed under oath.
The court ruled on a related issue in 2001,
holding that it was all right to require
American fathers, but not mothers, of
children born out of wedlock and abroad to
get a court order of establishing paternity or
swear to it under oath ....
"Court Upholds Gender Disparity
for Derivative Citizenship"
Metropolitan News-Enterprise
April 7, 2008
Sherri M. Okamoto
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
yesterday held [in United States v. Flores-
Villar, 07-50445,] that disparate residence
requirements for unwed male and female
citizens over the age of 14 who seek to
transmit citizenship to a child born abroad to
a non-citizen do not violate equal protection.
Assuming that intermediate scrutiny applied
to Ruben Flores-Villar's gender-based
challenge and rational basis review applied
to his age-based challenge to former sections
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a
three-judge panel rejected his claim to
citizenship through his father and affirmed
his conviction for illegally reentering the
country following deportation.
Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana, Mexico in
1974. His biological father, Ruben Trinidad
Floresvillar-Sandez, was not listed on
Flores-Villar's birth certificate, but
acknowledged Flores-Villar as his son by
filing an acknowledgment of paternity with
the Civil Registry in Mexico.
When Flores-Villar was two months old, his
father and paternal grandmother brought
him to the United States, and he was raised
in San Diego.
He was convicted of importing marijuana
and illegally entering the country in 2007
after being ordered removed a total of six
times between 1998 and 2005.
Citizenship Claimed
After his 2006 arrest and charge for being a
previously deported alien found in the
United States, Flores-Villar argued that he
thought he was a citizen through his father,
who had attained citizenship through his
mother-Flores-Villar' s paternal
grandmother-a citizen by birth.
The government moved in limine to exclude
evidence of derivative citizenship on the
ground that it was physically impossible for
Flores-Villar's father, who was sixteen when
Flores-Villar was born, to have been present
in the United States for five years after his
fourteenth birthday as required by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409.
When Flores-Villar was born, the sections
provided that if a United States citizen father
had a child out of wedlock abroad, with a
non-citizen mother, the father must have
resided in the United States for at least five
years after his 14th birthday to confer
citizenship on his child. In contrast, an out-
of-wedlock child born abroad to a United
States citizen mother had only to reside in
the country for a continuous period of one
year prior to birth in order to pass
citizenship.
U.S. District Judge Barry T. Moskowitz of
the Southern District of California granted
the government's motion and later found
Flores-Villar guilty following a bench trial
on stipulated facts.
Stateless Children
But on appeal, Judge Pamela Ann Rymer
explained that most foreign countries confer
citizenship by bloodline, not place of birth,
as in the United States. Thus, a United States
citizen mother who gives birth to an
illegitimate child in a foreign country that
confers citizenship based on bloodline alone
will have a child with no nationality at birth.
She reasoned that the disparate treatment
between mothers and fathers was justified
because the government has a substantial
interest in avoiding "stateless" children born
to citizen mothers, and also a substantial
interest in assuring a link between an unwed
citizen father and the United States.
Although "the fit is not perfect," she wrote,
"the means chosen substantially further
[these] objectives." Thus, she concluded, the
sections withstood constitutional scrutiny.
also contended that the
statutory scheme treated men over 19 years
of age differently than those under 19
insofar as it made it legally and physically
impossible for United States citizen fathers
under that age to confer citizenship upon
their foreign-born, illegitimate children,
even if they had resided in the United States
for 10 years.
But Rymer opined that a rational basis
supported such disparate treatment because
a father who has spent at least five years of
his life in the United States as a teenager
would have more of a connection with the
country to pass on to his child than a father
who lived in the country between the ages of
1 and 10.
Judges Cynthia Holcomb Hall and Andrew
J. Kleinfeld joined Rymer in her opinion....Flores-Villar
"Parent's Sex May Be Factor in
Citizenship, Court Rules"
The Washington Post
June 12, 2001
Charles Lane
The government may make it more difficult
for children born out of wedlock overseas to
U.S. citizen fathers to claim citizenship than
for the children of American mothers, the
Supreme Court ruled yesterday, rejecting a
claim that the different treatment violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
By a vote of 5 to 4, the court held that, in
adopting different rules depending on
whether the mother or father was a U.S.
citizen, Congress was attempting to ensure
that such children have a clear biological
and social attachment to their U.S. citizen
parent, and therefore was engaging in a
constitutionally acceptable form of gender
discrimination.
Women's rights groups had challenged the
law as one of the few surviving examples in
federal law of what they called gender-based
stereotypes about the parenting roles of men
and women.
But Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in the
opinion for the court, wrote, "There is
nothing irrational or improper in the
recognition that at the moment of birth-a
critical event in the statutory scheme and in
the whole tradition of citizenship law-the
mother's knowledge of the child and the fact
of parenthood have been established in a
way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed
father. This is not a stereotype."
The law in question says children born out
of wedlock abroad to mothers who are U.S.
citizens may become citizens almost
automatically. In the case of children of U.S.
citizen fathers, however, one of several legal
steps must be taken first to establish
paternity-before the child reaches the age
of 18.
The case decided yesterday involved Tuan
Ain Nguyen and his father, Joseph Boulais
of Texas. Nguyen was born in Saigon in
1969 and abandoned by his Vietnamese
mother soon thereafter. Boulais, who had
come to Vietnam with the U.S. government
during the Vietnam War, took custody of the
child and brought him to the States in
1975-but never acted to establish legal
paternity or have his son naturalized as a
citizen.
In 1992, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas
court to two counts of sexual abuse of a
minor, and was sentenced to 16 years in
prison. Three years later, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service moved to deport
him to Vietnam, his country of citizenship,
as an alien who had committed felonies
involving moral turpitude.
While that matter was tied up in the
immigration bureaucracy, Boulais obtained
a court order declaring him Nguyen's father
based on a DNA test. But an immigration
appeals board rejected Nguyen's subsequent
claim of citizenship, citing Boulais's failure
to act before his son's 18th birthday.
They appealed to a federal appeals court,
contending that the immigration law
discriminated against them on the basis of
sex. Last year that court, too, sided with the
federal government.
Having wrestled inconclusively with the
same issue in a 1998 case, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the appeal.
The case presented the unusual situation that
women's rights groups, who strongly
supported the appeal, were going to bat for
two men-one of them an admitted sex
offender-claiming sex discrimination.
The groups did so, they said, to establish the
larger principle that the government should
not legislate based on outmoded notions of
parenting roles. Indeed, the groups argued,
the fact that Nguyen's mother abandoned
him while his father took responsibility
refutes a premise of the immigration law's
gender-based distinction between men and
women.
"We tried to show that a lot of what this is
based on is historic discrimination," said
Nancy Duff Campbell of the National
Women's Law Center, which filed a friend-
of-the-court brief on behalf of Nguyen and
Boulais.
Dissenters agreed, saying that gender-
neutral alternatives to the law could easily
be devised and emphasizing that modem
DNA testing can establish paternity reliably,
even if a father is not present at the child's
birth.
"Indeed, the majority's discussion may itself
simply reflect the stereotype of male
irresponsibility that is no more a basis for
the validity of the classification than are
stereotypes about the traditional behavior
patterns of women," Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote in a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices David H. Souter, Stephen
G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
The case is Nguyen v. INS, No. 99-2071.
"Gender, Equal Protection & Immigration"
Constitutional Law Prof Blog
March 22, 2010
Ruthann Robson
The question [in Flores-Villar v. United
States] is a narrow one: whether the court's
decision in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001), permits gender discrimination that
has no biological basis?
Recall that the Court in Nguyen upheld 8
U.S.C. § 1409 which imposed different
requirements for a child's acquisition of
citizenship depending upon whether the
citizen parent is the mother or the father.
Writing for the Court, Kennedy found that
the statutory gender-based distinction-
applicable when the parents were unmarried,
when only parent was a citizen, and when
the child was born outside of the United
States-survived a constitutional challenge
based on the "equal protection guarantee
embedded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." The Majority found that
the statute served two important
governmental interests: the importance of
assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists and the importance of
assuring that the child and the citizen parent
have a demonstrated opportunity or potential
to develop the "real, everyday ties that
provide a connection between child and
citizen parent and, in turn, the United
States." The Court in Nguyen relied on
biological reasoning: women give birth and
men may not even realize their paternity,
concluding:
Given the 9-month interval between
conception and birth, it is not always
certain that a father will know that a
child was conceived, nor is it always
clear that even the mother will be
sure of the father's identity. This fact
takes on particular significance in the
case of a child born overseas and out
of wedlock. One concern in this
context has always been with young
people, men for the most part, who
are on duty with the Armed Forces in
foreign countries.
The Court then provided statistics about the
number of military men in foreign countries
in 1969, the year Nguyen was born in Viet
Nam. Although, as the dissenting opinion
noted, after Nguyen's parents split up, he
lived with the family of his father's new
girlfriend and in 1975, before his sixth
birthday, Nguyen came to the United States,
where he was raised by his father. A DNA
test showed a 99.98% probability of
paternity and the father obtained an order of
parentage from a state court.
The Court's grant of certiorari in Flores-
Villar will involve a reconsideration of
Nguyen. Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana,
Mexico 1974 to a non-citizen mother and a
United States citizen father who,
importantly, was sixteen at the time. His
father and grandmother, also a citizen,
brought Flores-Villar to the United States
for medical treatment when he was two
months old. He grew up in San Diego with
his grandmother and father, who
acknowledged paternity with the Civil
Registry in Mexico on June 2, 1985.
Apparently, Flores-Villar was not in touch
with his mother, who remained in Mexico.
The gendered differential imposed by the
statute at issue in Flores-Villar was the
requirement that a citizen father must have
resided in the United States for at least five
years after his fourteenth birthday to confer
citizenship on his child, while a citizen
mother had to reside in the United States for
a continuous period of only one year prior to
the child's birth to pass on citizenship.
Moreover, in the case of Flores-Villar, INS
denied a petition for citizenship on the basis
that because the citizen father was 16 years
old at the time of the child's birth, it was
"physically impossible" for the father to
have the required physical presence after the
age of 14 in order to comply with the statute.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory
scheme, holding that avoiding statelessness,
and assuring a link between an unwed
citizen father, and this country, to a child
born out of wedlock abroad who is to be a
citizen, are important interests, and that the
means chosen substantially further the
objectives. The Court stated: "Though the fit
is not perfect, it is sufficiently persuasive in
light of the virtually plenary power that
Congress has to legislate in the area of
immigration and citizenship."
This "fit" will certainly be at issue before
the United States Supreme Court. Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Nguyen,
joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
stressed the heightened scrutiny required by
Virginia v. US (VMJ) with its requirement of
a closer fit between the "discriminatory"
means chosen and gender stereotypes. The
dissenting Justices reasoned that the statute
was "paradigmatic of a historic regime that
left women with responsibility, and freed
men from responsibility, for nonmarital
children" and could easily be rendered sex-
neutral.
In Flores-Villar, because the gender
differential is a residency requirement-and
not, as in Nguyen, a relationship with child
requirement-the "fit" may not be
sufficiently tight. If the Court applies VMT,
the question will be whether or not there is
something unique about men that requires
them to have a longer residency than women
before men are truly "citizens." However,
the Court will also certainly rely on the
plenary power of Congress in the area of
citizenship. Balancing gender equality and
citizenship will be the task for the Court--a
task which the newest Justice will certainly
undertake.
NASA v. Nelson
09-530
Ruling Below: Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, NASA v. Nelson,
2010 U.S. LEXIS 2298 (2010).
NASA adopted a new policy requiring low-risk employees at Caltech's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory to submit to in-depth background investigations to retain their employment at the
facility. The employees filed suit alleging three primary claims: (1) NASA violated the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by acting without statutory authority in imposing the
investigations on contract employees; (2) the investigations constitute unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the investigations violate their constitutional right
to informational privacy. The district court denied the employees' request for a preliminary
injunction and rejected the employees' Fourth Amendment argument, holding that a background
investigation was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the
appellate court granted a temporary injunction. The appellate court agreed with the district court
that the investigations did not implicate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches, but found that the employees had raised serious questions as to the merits
of their informational privacy claim. The information sought in some of the questionnaires raised
serious privacy issues. Additionally, the balance of hardships tipped sharply in the employees'
favor since they risked either losing their jobs or subjecting themselves to a violation of their
constitutional rights.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the government violates a federal contract employee's
constitutional right to informational privacy when it asks in the course of a background
investigation whether the employee has received counseling or treatment for illegal drug use that
has occurred within the past year, and the employee's response is used only for employment
purposes and is protected under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (2) Whether the government
violates a federal contract employee's constitutional right to informational privacy when it asks
the employee's designated references for any adverse information that may have a bearing on the
employee's suitability for employment at a federal facility, the reference's response is used only
for employment purposes, and the information obtained is protected under the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a.
Robert M. NELSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, an Agency of the
United States; Michael Griffin, Director of NASA, in his official capacity only; United
States Department of Commerce; Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary of Commerce, in his
official capacity only; California Institute of Technology, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed June 20, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
The named appellants in this action
("Appellants") are scientists, engineers, and
administrative support personnel at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory ("JPL"), a research
laboratory run jointly by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
("NASA") and the California Institute of
Technology ("Caltech"). Appellants sued
NASA, Caltech, and the Department of
Commerce (collectively "Appellees"),
challenging NASA's recently adopted
requirement that "low risk" contract
employees like themselves submit to in-
depth background investigations. The
district court denied Appellants' request for
a preliminary injunction, finding they were
unlikely to succeed on the merits and unable
to demonstrate irreparable harm. Because
Appellants raise serious legal and
constitutional questions and because the
balance of hardships tips sharply in their
favor, we reverse and remand.
I
JPL is located on federally owned land, but
operated entirely by Caltech pursuant to a
contract with NASA. Like all JPL personnel,
Appellants are employed by Caltech, not the
government. Appellants are designated by
the government as "low risk" contract
employees. They do not work with classified
material.
Appellants contest NASA's newly instated
procedures requiring "low risk" JPL
personnel to yield to broad background
investigations as a condition of retaining
access to JPL's facilities. NASA's new
policy requires that every JPL employee
undergo a National Agency Check with
Inquiries (NACI), the same background
investigation required of government civil
service employees, before he or she can
obtain an identification badge needed for
access to JPL's facilities. The NACI
investigation requires the applicant to
complete and submit Standard Form 85 (SF
85), which asks for (1) background
information, including residential,
educational, employment, and military
histories; (2) the names of three references
that "know you well;" and (3) disclosure of
any illegal drug use, possession, supply, or
manufacture within the past year, along with
the nature and circumstances of any such
activities and any treatment or counseling
received. . . . Finally, SF 85 requires the
applicant to sign an "Authorization for
Release of Information" that authorizes the
government to collect "any information
relating to [his or her] activities from
schools, residential management agents,
employers, criminal justice agencies, retail
business establishments, or other sources of
information." . . . The record is vague as to
the exact extent to and manner in which the
government will seek this information, but it
is undisputed that each of the applicants'
references, employers, and landlords will be
sent an "Investigative Request for Personal
Information" (Form 42), which asks whether
the recipient has "any reason to question
[the applicant's] honesty or trustworthiness"
or has "any adverse information about [the
applicant's] employment, residence, or
activities" concerning "violations of law,"
"financial integrity," "abuse of alcohol
and/or drugs," "mental or emotional
stability," "general behavior or conduct," or
"other matters." The recipient is asked to
explain any adverse information noted on
the form. Once the information has been
collected, NASA and the federal Office of
Personnel Management determine whether
the employee is "suitable" for continued
access to NASA's facilities, though the
exact mechanics of this suitability
determination are in dispute.
On August 30, 2007, Appellants filed suit
alleging, both individually and on behalf of
the class of JPL employees in non-sensitive
or "low risk" positions, that NASA's newly
imposed background investigations are
unlawful. Appellants bring three primary
claims: (1) NASA and the Department of
Commerce (collectively "Federal
Appellees") violated the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") by acting without
statutory authority in imposing the
investigations on contract employees; (2) the
investigations constitute unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment; and (3) the investigations
violate their constitutional right to
informational privacy.
[The district court denied the Appellants'
request for a preliminary injunction against
the new policy.]
On appeal, a motions panel of our court
granted a temporary injunction pending a
merits determination of the denial of the
preliminary injunction. Nelson v. NASA, 506
F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2007). The panel
concluded that the information sought by SF
85 and its waiver requirement raised serious
privacy issues and questioned whether it was
narrowly tailored to meet the government's
legitimate interest in ascertaining the
identity of its low-risk employees. The panel
further found that "[t]he balance of
hardships tips sharply in favor of
[A]ppellants," who risk losing their jobs
pending appeal, whereas there was no
exigent reason for performing the NACI
investigations during the few months
pending appeal given that "it has been more
than three years since the Presidential
Directive [upon which the government
relies] was issued."
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief,
Appellants must demonstrate either "(1) a
likelihood of success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that
serious questions going to the merits were
raised and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in its favor."...
Upon review of the merits of the district
court's denial of preliminary injunctive
relief, we find ourselves in agreement with
the motions panel. Appellants have
demonstrated serious questions as to their
informational privacy claim, and the balance
of hardships tips sharply in their favor. We
therefore conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Appellants'
motion for a preliminary injunction, and we
reverse and remand.
B. APA Claim
Appellants first claim that Federal Appellees
violated the APA by imposing background
investigations on contract employees
without any basis in executive order or
statute. The district court found that
Congress gave NASA the authority to
conduct such investigations in the Space Act
of 1958....
... Because the Space Act appears to grant
NASA the statutory authority to require the
investigations here at issue, we agree with
the district court that Appellants are unlikely
to succeed on the merits of their APA claim.
C. Fourth Amendment Claim
We also agree with the district court's
conclusion that Appellants are unlikely to
succeed on their Fourth Amendment claims,
because the government's actions are not
likely to be deemed "searches" within the
meaning of the Amendment. An action to
uncover information is generally considered
a "search" if the target of the search has a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
information being sought, a term of art
meaning a "subjective expectation of
privacy . that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." One does not have
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
one's information for Fourth Amendment
purposes merely because that information is
of a "private" nature; instead, Fourth
Amendment protection can evaporate in any
of several ways. To succeed on their Fourth
Amendment claim, therefore, Appellants
must demonstrate that either the Form 42
inquiries sent to third parties or the SF 85
questionnaire itself violates a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" so as to be
considered a "search" within the meaning of
the Amendment.
1. Form 42 Inquiries
"What a person knowingly exposes to the
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection," Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, (1967); however,
information does not lose Fourth
Amendment protection simply because it is
conveyed to another party. For example, in
Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic
listening device to the outside of a public
telephone booth and recorded the defendant
transmitting illegal betting information over
the telephone. Even though the booth's
occupant had voluntarily conveyed the
information in the conversation to the party
on the other end of the line, the Court found
that he was "surely entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece
w[ould] not be broadcast to the world," so
the covert surveillance was considered a
search within the meaning of the
Amendment.
On the other hand, in United States v. White,
the Supreme Court held that the electronic
surveillance of a conversation between a
defendant and a government informant did
not constitute a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 401 U.S. 745, 754.
The Court acknowledged that, as in Katz,
the speaker likely expected the content of
the conversations to be kept private;
however, it held as a bright-line rule that the
Fourth Amendment "affords no protection to
'a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it."' In United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),
holding that the government could subpoena
private bank records without implicating the
Fourth Amendment, the Court extended the
bright-line rule to all information knowingly
revealed to the government by third parties..
In the challenged background investigations,
the government will send written Form 42
inquiries to the applicant's acquaintances.
Through these inquiries, the third parties
may disclose highly personal information
about the applicant. As in White and Miller,
the applicant presumably revealed this
information to the third party with the
understandable expectation that this
information would be kept confidential.
Nonetheless, these written inquiries appear
to fit squarely under Miller's bright-line rule
and therefore cannot be considered
"searches" under the Fourth Amendment.
2. SF 85 Questionnaire
The SF 85 questionnaire required of the
applicant is also unlikely to be considered a
Fourth Amendment "search." Requiring an
individual to answer questions may lead to
the forced disclosure of information that he
or she reasonably expects to keep private.
Historically, however, when "the objective
is to obtain testimonial rather than physical
evidence, the relevant constitutional
amendment is not the Fourth but the Fifth."
Greenawalt v. Ind Dep't of Corr., 397 F.3d
587, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
psychological examination required for
continued government employment was not
a search under the Fourth Amendment).
As Judge Posner notes in Greenawalt, direct
questioning can potentially lead to a far
greater invasion of privacy than many of the
physical examinations that have in the past
been considered Fourth Amendment
"searches." Nonetheless, applying the
Fourth Amendment to such questioning
would force the courts to analyze a wide
range of novel contexts (e.g., courtroom
testimony, police witness interviews, credit
checks, and, as here, background checks)
under a complex doctrine, with its
cumbersome warrant and probable cause
requirements and their myriad exceptions,
that was designed with completely different
circumstances in mind. Moreover, declining
to extend the Fourth Amendment to direct
questioning will by no means leave
individuals unprotected, as such contexts
will remain governed by traditional Fifth
and Sixth Amendment interrogation rights,
and the right to informational privacy
described below.
Because neither the written inquiries
directed at third parties nor the SF 85
questionnaire directed at the applicants will
likely be deemed "searches," Appellants are
unlikely to succeed on their Fourth
Amendment claims.
D. Informational Privacy Claim
Although the district court correctly found
that Appellants were unlikely to succeed on
their APA and Fourth Amendment claims, it
significantly underestimated the likelihood
that Appellants would succeed on their
informational privacy claim....
We have repeatedly acknowledged that the
Constitution protects an "individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."
This interest covers a wide range of personal
matters, including sexual activity, medical
information, and financial matters. If the
government's actions compel disclosure of
private information, it "has the burden of
showing that its use of the information
would advance a legitimate state interest and
that its actions are narrowly tailored to meet
the legitimate interest." We must "balance
the government's interest in having or using
the information against the individual's
interest in denying access," weighing,
among other things:
"the type of [information] requested,
. . . the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, . . . the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent unauthorized
disclosure, the degree of need for
access, and whether there is an
express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other
recognizable public interest
militating towards access."
Both the SF 85 questionnaire and the Form
42 written inquiries require the disclosure of
personal information and each presents a
ripe controversy. Therefore, whereas the
district court limited its analysis to the SF 85
questionnaire, we consider the
constitutionality of both aspects of the
investigation in turn.
1. SF 85 Questionnaire
Appellants concede that most of the
questions on the SF 85 form are
unproblematic and do not implicate the
constitutional right to informational privacy.
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They do however challenge the
constitutionality of one group of questions
concerning illegal drugs. The questionnaire
asks the applicant:
In the last year, have you used,
possessed, supplied, or manufactured
illegal drugs? ...If you answered
"Yes," provide information relating
to the types of substance(s), the
nature of the activity, and any other
details relating to your involvement
with illegal drugs. Include any
treatment or counseling received.
The form indicates that "[n]either your
truthful response nor information derived
from your response will be used as evidence
against you in any subsequent criminal
proceeding." The district court concluded
that the requested information implicated the
right to informational privacy, but found that
there were "adequate safeguards in place [to
deal with these] sensitive questions."
Other courts have been skeptical that
questions concerning illegal drug use-
much less possession, supply, or
manufacture-would even implicate the
right to informational privacy. For example,
in Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.
1986), the Tenth Circuit held that the
disclosure of firefighters' past illegal drug
use did not violate their informational
privacy rights. The Court held that "[t]he
possession of contraband drugs does not
implicate any aspect of personal identity
which, under prevailing precedent, is
entitled to constitutional protection.
Validly enacted drug laws put citizens on
notice that this realm is not a private one."
In National Treasury Employees' Union v.
U.S. Department of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237
(5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit considered
a similar form to the SF 85 questionnaire,
with almost identical questions concerning
illegal drugs, and rejected the applicants'
informational privacy claims. The Court
raised similar concerns to the Tenth Circuit:
Today's society has made the bold
and unequivocal statement that
illegal substance abuse will not be
tolerated. The government declared
an all-out war on illegal drugs more
than a decade ago.... Surely anyone
who works for the government has a
diminished expectation that his drug
and alcohol abuse history can be kept
secret, given that he works for the
very government that has declared
war on substance abuse.
The Court also noted that the plaintiffs in
that case were all federal employees in
either "High" or "Moderate" risk "public
trust" positions, and were thus acutely
"aware of [their] employer's elevated
expectations in [their] integrity and
performance."
Like the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, we are
sensitive to the government's interest in
uncovering and addressing illegal substance
abuse among its employees and contractors,
given the public stance it has taken against
such abuse. This government interest is
undoubtedly relevant to the constitutional
balancing inquiry: whether the forced
disclosure "would advance a legitimate state
interest and [is] narrowly tailored to meet
the legitimate interest." We are less
convinced, however, that the government's
interest should inform the threshold question
of whether requested information is
sufficiently personal to invoke the
constitutional right to privacy. We doubt
that the government can strip personal
information of constitutional protection
simply by criminalizing the underlying
conduct-instead, to force disclosure of
personal information, the government must
at least demonstrate that the disclosure
furthers a legitimate state interest. Drug
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dependence and abuse carries an enormous
stigma in our society and "is not generally
disclosed by individuals to the public." If we
had to reach the issue, therefore, we would
be inclined to agree with the district court
that SF 85's drug questions reach sensitive
issues that implicate the constitutional right
to informational privacy.
We do not need to decide this issue,
however, because even if the question
requiring disclosure of prior drug use,
possession, supply, and manufacture does
implicate the privacy right, it is narrowly
tailored to achieve the government's
legitimate interest. As our sister circuits
have lucidly explained, the federal
government has taken a strong stance in its
war on illegal drugs, and this stance would
be significantly undermined if its own
employees and contractors freely ignored its
laws. By requiring applicants to disclose
whether they have "used, possessed,
supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs"
within the past year, and, if so, to explain the
"nature of the activity" and "any other
details relating to [the applicant's]
involvement with illegal drugs, "the
government has crafted a narrow inquiry
designed to limit the disclosure of personal
information to that which is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interest.
The same cannot be said, however, for
requiring applicants to disclose "any
treatment or counseling received" for their
drug problems. Information relating to
medical treatment and psychological
counseling fall squarely within the domain
protected by the constitutional right to
informational privacy. The government has
not suggested any legitimate interest in
requiring the disclosure of such information;
indeed, any treatment or counseling received
for illegal drug use would presumably lessen
the government's concerns regarding the
underlying activity. Because SF 85 appears
to compel disclosure of personal medical
information for which the government has
failed to demonstrate a legitimate state
interest, Appellants are likely to succeed on
this-albeit narrow portion of their
informational privacy challenge to SF 85.
2. Form 42 Inquiries
The Form 42 written inquiries-omitted
from the district court's analysis as a result
of its erroneous ripeness holding-are much
more problematic. Form 42 solicits "any
adverse information" concerning "financial
integrity," "abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,"
"mental or emotional stability," "general
behavior or conduct," and "other matters."
These open-ended questions are designed to
elicit a wide range of adverse, private
information that "is not generally disclosed
by individuals to the public" and therefore
seemingly implicate the right to
informational privacy. The government
suggests that even if the information
disclosed in the investigation implicates the
right to informational privacy, the scheme
must be upheld because the government has
taken measures to keep the information from
being disclosed to the general public.
Although the risk of public disclosure is
undoubtedly an important consideration in
our analysis, it is only one of many factors
that we should consider. Therefore, although
safeguards exist to help prevent disclosure
of the applicants' highly sensitive
information, Federal Appellees must still
demonstrate that the background
investigations are justified by legitimate
state interests and that Form 42's questions
are "narrowly tailored to meet those
legitimate interests."
In this respect, the right to informational
privacy differs from the Fourth Amendment.
If the constitutional right to
informational privacy were limited to cases
that involved a Fourth Amendment "search,"
the two rights would be entirely redundant.
Indeed, although the two doctrines often
overlap, we have repeatedly found the right
to informational privacy implicated in
contexts that did not involve a Fourth
Amendment "search."
We agree with the government that it has
several legitimate reasons for investigating
its contractors. NASA has an interest in
verifying its contractors' identities to make
sure that they are who they say they are, and
it has an interest in ensuring the security of
the JPL facility so as not to jeopardize the
costly investments housed therein.
Appellants concede, as they must, that these
are legitimate government interests.
The government has failed to demonstrate,
however, that Form 42's questions are
"narrowly tailored" to meet these legitimate
interests. Initially, we note that although
NASA has a general interest in keeping the
JPL facility secure, there is no specific
evidence in the record to suggest that any of
the "low risk" JPL personnel pose such a
security risk; indeed, NASA appears to
designate as "moderate risk" any individual
who has the "opportunity to cause damage
to a significant NASA asset or influence the
design or implementation [of] a security
mechanism designed to protect a significant
NASA asset." More importantly, Form 42's
broad, open-ended questions appear to range
far beyond the scope of the legitimate state
interests that the government has proposed.
Asking for "any adverse information about
this person's employment, residence, or
activities" may solicit some information
relevant to the applicant's identity or
security risk, but there are no safeguards in
place to limit the disclosures to information
relevant to these interests. Instead, the form
invites the recipient to reveal any negative
information of which he or she is aware. It is
difficult to see how the vague solicitation of
derogatory information concerning the
applicant's "general behavior or conduct"
and "other matters" could be narrowly
tailored to meet any legitimate need, much
less the specific interests that Federal
Appellees have offered to justify the new
requirement.
Finally, the context in which the written
inquiries are posed further supports
Appellants' claim. In Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), we
focused not only on the private nature of
questions asked, but also on the lack of
standards governing the inquiry .... "When
the state's questions directly intrude on the
core of a person's constitutionally protected
privacy and associational interests . . , an
unbounded, standardless inquiry, even if
founded upon a legitimate state interest,
cannot withstand the heightened scrutiny
with which we must view the state's action."
In this case, the government's questions
stem from SF 85's extremely broad
authorization, allowing it "to obtain any
information" from any source, subject to
other releases being necessary only in some
vague and unspecified contexts. Federal
Appellees have steadfastly refused to
provide any standards narrowly tailoring the
investigations to the legitimate interests they
offer as justification. Given that Form 42's
open-ended and highly private questions are
authorized by this broad, standardless
waiver and do not appear narrowly tailored
to any legitimate government interest, the
district court erred in finding that Appellants
were unlikely to succeed on their
informational privacy claim.
E. Balance of Hardships
The balance of hardships tips sharply toward
Appellants, who face a stark choice--either
violation of their constitutional rights or loss
of their jobs. The district court erroneously
concluded that Appellants will not suffer
any irreparable harm because they could be
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retroactively compensated for any temporary
denial of employment. It is true that
"monetary injury is not normally considered
irreparable," and the JPL employees who
choose to give up their jobs may later be
made whole financially if the policy is
struck down. However, in the meantime,
there is a substantial risk that a number of
employees will not be able to finance such a
principled position and so will be coerced
into submitting to the allegedly
unconstitutional NACI investigation. Unlike
monetary injuries, constitutional violations
cannot be adequately remedied through
damages and therefore generally constitute
irreparable harm. Morever, the loss of one's
job does not carry merely monetary
consequences; it carries emotional damages
and stress, which cannot be compensated by
mere back payment of wages.
On the other side of the balance, NASA has
not demonstrated any specific harm that it
will face if it is enjoined for the pendency of
the adjudication from applying its broad
investigatory scheme to "low risk" JPL
contract employees, many of whom have
worked at the laboratory for decades. As
Caltech argues, JPL has successfully
functioned without any background
investigations since the first contract
between NASA and JPL in 1958, so
granting injunctive relief would make
NASA no worse off than it has ever been.
Moreover, an injunction in this case would
not affect NASA's ability to investigate JPL
personnel in "high risk" or "moderate risk"
positions, significantly undercutting any
lingering security fears. Finally, we note that
NASA has taken years to implement NACI
at JPL, a fact we construe as weakening any
urgency in imposing the investigations
before Appellants' claims are fully
adjudicated on their merits.
III
[The court concludes that preliminary
injunctive relief should apply both to
Caltech and to Federal Appellees.]
IV
Appellants have raised serious questions as
to the merits of their informational privacy
claim and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in their favor. The district court's
denial of the preliminary injunction was
based on errors of law and hence was an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand with instructions to fashion
preliminary injunctive relief consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
"Supreme Court to Take on Federal
Employee Privacy"
Law360
March 8, 2010
Allison Grande
The U.S. Supreme Court has elected to
review a federal appeals court's decision to
grant a request by NASA scientists for a
preliminary injunction to halt allegedly
deep-reaching background checks on low-
risk employees at the space agency's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory [in NASA et al. v.
Nelson et aL ].
The high court on Monday granted NASA's
Nov. 2 petition for writ of certiorari,
allowing the agency a chance to argue that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit erred in its January 2008 reversal of
a lower court's decision to deny the
scientists injunctive relief in their challenge
to government rules regarding background
checks.
Twenty-eight senior scientists and engineers
at JPL-which conducts research for NASA
in conjunction with the California Institute
of Technology-filed suit against NASA,
the U.S. Department of Commerce and
Caltech in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California in August
2007, seeking to stop the implementation of
new background investigation requirements.
The requirements were created through a
2004 executive order by President George
W. Bush, and compelled all federal agencies
and facilities to require their workers to have
identification badges, according the
complaint.
To get a badge needed to enter JPL's
facilities, all workers had to submit to a
background check, the suit states. They were
required to sign a broad written waiver,
permitting investigators to obtain records
from their past employment files, and to
question friends and associates about their
emotional health, financial integrity and
general conduct, it claims.
The workers argue that the rules surrounding
these background checks are
unconstitutional and intrusive, and that they
unlawfully allow unknown government
officials to ask all manner of questions about
people's personal lives, including sex lives
and emotional states.
The district court denied the workers'
request for injunctive relief in October 2007,
but the Ninth Circuit overturned that
decision, ruling that the workers had raised
serious legal and constitutional questions
that warranted a preliminary injunction
barring NASA's policies.
Current law doesn't allow background
investigations in the way NASA intended,
the appeals court said. According to the law,
investigations can only be in the interest of
national security if the target of the
investigation holds a sensitive position, but
in this case the workers are low-risk
employees who don't hold sensitive
positions, it ruled.
Considering the breadth of questions the
workers would be asked, it would be
difficult to see how these questions could be
narrowly tailored to meet any legitimate
need, much less the specific interests that
NASA offered, the Ninth Circuit found.
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"Asking for 'any adverse information about
this person's employment, residence or
activities' may solicit some information
relevant . . . but there are absolutely no
safeguards in place to limit the disclosures
to information relevant to these interests,"
the opinion said. "Instead, the form invites
the recipient to reveal any negative
information of which he or she is aware."
The appeals court also disagreed with the
district court's finding that the employees
wouldn't suffer any irreparable harm as a
result of the policy.
The government filed a petition for a
rehearing en banc following the reversal, but
the Ninth Circuit issued a new opinion in
June 2008 that mooted the appeal.
The U.S. again appealed for an en banc
hearing, and lost its bid in a June 2009 vote
that "was not close," according to a
concurrence that accompanied the denial.
Dan Stormer, an attorney for the scientists,
on Monday called the Supreme Court's
decision to hear the appeal "disappointing"
but remained confident in his clients'
position in the suit.
"The informational privacy right is well-
founded by constitutional analysis, and the
Supreme Court, when fully and properly
presented with the information, will find
that," he said.
The case is NASA et at v. Nelson et at,
case number 09-530, in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"New Supreme Court Case on the Constitutional
Right to Informational Privacy"
The Volokh Conspiracy
March 8, 2010
Eugene Volokh
The Supreme Court has just granted cert in
NASA v. Nelson....
The case involves a challenge brought by
various contract employees working
indirectly for NASA, claiming that NASA's
then-new background check policy violated
a federal constitutional right to
informational privacy. The Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on this claim, and thus held that
they were entitled to a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the policy.
In particular, the Circuit concluded that it
was likely unconstitutional for the
government to ask various people who knew
the employees-at least "references,
employers, and landlords" and perhaps
others-broad questions. Such question
presumptively violated a constitutional right
to privacy discussed by the Supreme Court
in Whalen v. Roe, and the presumption
couldn't be overcome on the grounds that
the questioning was "narrowly tailored" to
the government's interests:
Form 42 [which was sent to people
who had dealt with the employees]
solicits "any adverse information"
concerning "financial integrity,"
"abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,"
"mental or emotional stability," and
"other matters." These open-ended
questions are designed to elicit a
wide range of adverse, private
information that "is not generally
disclosed by individuals to the
public"; accordingly, they must be
deemed to implicate the right to
informational privacy....
Considering the breadth of Form
42's questions, it is difficult to see
how they could be narrowly tailored
to meet any legitimate need, much
less the specific interests that Federal
Appellees have offered to justify the
new requirement. Asking for "any
adverse information about this
person's employment, residence, or
activities" may solicit some
information relevant to "identity,"
"national security," or "protecting
federal information systems," but
there are absolutely no safeguards in
place to limit the disclosures to
information relevant to these
interests. Instead, the form invites
the recipient to reveal any negative
information of which he or she is
aware. There is nothing "narrowly
tailored" about such a broad
inquisition.
It seems to me that despite the court's
insistence that the opinion is quite narrow,
its implications seem stunningly broad; and
in particular, it seems to me they would
dramatically affect the course of ordinary
government investigations.
Say a police officer-or SEC investigator or
FBI agent or a wide range of other
government investigator-is trying to
investigate a crime. Naturally, to get a
search warrant for someone's property, the
officer would need probable cause to believe
that the warrant would uncover evidence of
a crime. But the officer often doesn't start
out with such probable cause.
Instead, I take it that the officer would often
ask around about each person who might be
involved in the crime, even if chances are
that the person isn't involved. He might go
to landlords, employers, hotel clerks,
acquaintances, and others, and ask
questions, including open-ended questions.
And the questions might deal with private
matters, such as the suspect's romantic
entanglements, sexual orientation, political
ideology, financial pressures, medical
problems, and the like. It would be wrong
and possibly unconstitutional for the
government to misuse this information, for
instance by arresting and prosecuting the
suspect because of his political views, even
when he wouldn't have been arrested and
prosecuted for the same offense if his views
were different. But getting this information
might well be helpful, depending on the
circumstances, since it might reveal possible
motives, associates, and other important
information.
What's more, the police officer would
generally be able (with a prosecutor's help)
to order people to answer such questions, by
subpoenaing them to testify. The officer and
prosecutor can get even highly confidential
information, such as bank records, records
of the telephone numbers the person has
called, and the like, without probable cause:
All it would take is a subpoena to the bank,
and such subpoenas to third parties don't
violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
there is no probable cause for them. I realize
that many disagree with this position, as to
subpoenas (though I haven't heard much
disagreement as to the asking around
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs). But
it is pretty clear that this is indeed the
Court's view of the Fourth Amendment.
There are some limits on this; for instance,
the officer can't subpoena privileged
lawyer-client communications, and there are
likely limits on the officer's power to
subpoena abortion records and the like. But
generally speaking a great many records,
including bank and telephone records, are
available without the need for probable
cause or any showing of "narrow tailoring."
In fact, the way that officers are supposed to
develop the probable cause needed to get
search warrants is precisely by gathering
information without search warrants-
including asking questions of people who
might know the information.
The Ninth Circuit's decision, however,
suggests that all such investigations are
potentially subject not just to the Fourth
Amendment (and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, when it
comes to coercive questioning of the suspect
himself), but also to the right of privacy.
After all, the police officer or other
government investigator is as much a
government actor as is NASA. (The right to
privacy, if it applies here, applies equally to
the federal government and state and local
governments.) If anything, the constitutional
constraints might apply even more to the
government acting as sovereign to
investigate private individuals, as opposed to
the government acting as employer to
investigate its own employees or
contractors. They certainly wouldn't apply
any less.
So say an officer is investigating an alleged
theft, and there a bunch of people who had
the opportunity to commit the theft, though
the great majority of them are likely to be
innocent. The officer will no longer be free
to ask people broad questions about what
they know about a potential suspect, and in
particular whether they have any
information about their "financial integrity,"
"abuse of alcohol and/or drugs," "mental or
emotional stability," or "other matter."
After all, while asking such questions "may
solicit some information relevant to [the
investigation], there are absolutely no
safeguards in place to limit the disclosures
to information relevant to these interests."
How could there be? The officer doesn't
know yet exactly what's going to be
relevant, and might not know until much
later, when a casual revelation that Joe was
sleeping with Mary, coupled with the
revelation that Mary had an expensive
cocaine habit, might explain why Joe might
have had a special motive to commit the
crime.
And presumably asking around about a
person's sexual partners, political beliefs,
medical condition, financial obligations, and
the like would be even more likely
unconstitutional, since that would be direct
questioning about matters that are most
likely to be seen as private. Yet, as I
mentioned above, that sort of picture of
people's lives is often vital to figuring out
who might have the motive to do something,
or who his likely accomplices might be, or
even who else might be worth asking about
the matter.
Now maybe this is the way things should be.
Maybe even when there's no search or
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes,
and when there's no compelled self-
incrimination for Fifth Amendment
purposes, there should be an extra
constitutional requirement that asking
around about a suspect be "narrowly
tailored" if the questioning may reveal
private information. Maybe the police
shouldn't ask broad questions, but be limited
to focused questions that are directly
supportable at that point by what the police
already know.
But I'm pretty skeptical that this would
indeed be a good constitutional law rule-
and I see no basis in Whalen or in the
Court's other precedents for suggesting that
there's a constitutional right to information
privacy that so constrains the government's
asking questions about people. The
government doesn't need the employee's
agreement to ask around about him, just as it
doesn't need a potential suspect's agreement
to ask around about him. There just isn't a
constitutional right not to have the
government ask other people questions
about you. So I'm glad the Court agreed to
hear the case, and I predict that it will
reverse. I'll go further and say that I doubt
there'll be more than 2 votes to affirm the
Ninth Circuit (at least on the informational
privacy grounds), and quite possibly fewer.
"NASA v. Nelson: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Information Privacy?"
Concurring Opinions
March 9, 2010
Daniel Solove
The U.S. Supreme Court has just granted
cert. on NASA v. Nelson, 512 F.3d 1134
(9th Cir. 2008). In this case, NASA required
employees to undergo background checks
and answer questions about very private
matters, including "any adverse
information" about financial integrity,
alcohol and drug abuse, and mental and
emotional stability. Plaintiffs, a group of
"low risk" contract employees, sought a
preliminary injunction that the investigation
violated their constitutional rights. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit granted
the injunction.
There is a lot at stake in this case, for it
potentially involves whether or not a
constitutional right exists-the little-known
constitutional right to information privacy.
Despite its obscurity, this right is recognized
by the vast majority of federal circuit courts
and there are scores of decisions involving
this right.
Here are the issues cert. was granted on:
1. Whether the government violates a
federal contract employee's
constitutional right to informational
privacy when it asks in the course of
a background investigation whether
the employee has received
counseling or treatment for illegal
drug use that has occurred within the
past year, and the employee's
response is used only for
employment purposes and is
protected under the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. 552a.
2. Whether the government violates a
federal contract employee's
constitutional right to informational
privacy when it asks the employee's
designated references for any
adverse information that may have a
bearing on the employee's suitability
for employment at a federal facility,
the reference's response is used only
for employment purposes, and the
information obtained is protected
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
552a.
The cert. questions are narrowly posed, so
there's hope the Supreme Court will not
eliminate the right. But I see it as a
possibility. Ultimately, I believe the
following:
1. The constitutional right to information
privacy does (and should) exist.
2. The court's holding in NASA v. Nelson
constitutes a big expansion of the
constitutional right to information privacy. It
doesn't follow from most of the cases
interpreting that right.
3. There may be a First Amendment
argument to support the plaintiffs.
I will address the first contention in this
post, and the other two in a subsequent post.
The constitutional right at issue is a little-
known spinoff right to the constitutional
right to privacy, most famously declared in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 478
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). In these cases, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Constitution protects a
"right to privacy" grounded in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments. The Supreme Court issued an
extensive line of cases involving the
constitutional right to privacy, and these
cases have generally involved freedom from
government interference in making certain
kinds of private decisions about one's
health, contraception, child-rearing, and
abortion.
The constitutional right to information
privacy emerged in a case called Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The case
involved a government record system of
people taking prescriptions for certain
medications. Although the government
promised that the information was
confidential and secure, the plaintiffs feared
the possibility of the information leaking
out.
The Supreme Court began its opinion by
noting that the right to privacy protects not
only "independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions" but also the
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters." Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs lost because the
government provided adequate security to
the information, thus meeting its
constitutional obligations to avoid
disclosure. At the end of the opinion, the
Court stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data
banks or other massive government
files.... The right to collect and use
such data for public purposes is
typically accompanied by a
concomitant statutory or regulatory
duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures. . . . [In some
circumstances that duty has its roots
in the Constitution.
There has long been a debate about what the
Court was doing in Whalen. Some believe
that the discussion of the constitutional right
to information privacy was just dicta, and
the Court was just reiterating an argument
plaintiffs in that case made and then waxing
eloquent at the end of the opinion. But I
don't believe this is the case.
In addition to Whalen, the Supreme Court
decided one other case involving the
constitutional right to information privacy-
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977). President Nixon
asserted a privacy interest in his
communications and records while
President. The Court concluded that the
Constitution protected the privacy of his
personal communications with his family
but not his records dealing with his official
duties. In so holding, the Court cited
Whalen:
One element of privacy has been
characterized as "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. . . ." Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 599 (1977). We
may agree with appellant that, at
least when Government intervention
is at stake, public officials, including
the President, are not wholly without
constitutionally protected privacy
rights in matters of personal life
unrelated to any acts done by them in
their public capacity. Presidents who
have established Presidential
libraries have usually withheld
matters concerned with family or
personal finances, or have deposited
such materials with restrictions on
their screening.
Whalen and Nixon were the only two
Supreme Court cases to mention the
constitutional right to information privacy.
But in subsequent years, a majority of
federal circuit courts have explicitly
recognized the right, including the 2nd, 3rd,
4th, 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits. The 6th
Circuit recognizes the right, but less broadly
than the circuit courts above. "Absent a clear
indication from the Supreme Court we will
not construe isolated statements in Whalen
and Nixon more broadly than their context
allows to recognize a general constitutional
right to have the disclosure of private
information measured against the need for
disclosure." J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080,
1090 (6th Cir. 1981). The only circuit to
express doubts about the constitutional right
to information privacy is the D.C. Circuit.
I believe that the constitutional right to
information privacy exists, and it ensures
that whenever the government collects
personal information, it has a duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. This duty consists
in avoiding the intentional disclosure of the
information when there isn't a compelling
reason to do so. It also consists in providing
adequate data security.
I hope that the Supreme Court does not use
NASA v. Nelson as an opportunity to
eliminate the constitutional right to
information privacy. For one, I'd have to do
a major revision of my casebook since I
include many cases involving this right, see
Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz,
Information Privacy Law (3rd ed. 2009)-
and that certainly wouldn't be fun! But more
importantly, the constitutional right to
information privacy serves a profound
function in today's Information Age. The
government has vast powers to gather
personal information and maintains
extensive dossiers of people's data, and this
information can be very sensitive, critical to
people's reputations and well-being, and the
leaking of it can result in serious harm. I
doubt we can go back to the early days of
government where not much personal data
was collected. But if the government is
going to keep our data, it should have a
responsibility to avoid unwarranted
disclosures and to keep it secure. The
constitutional right to information privacy is
a sensible extension of the right to privacy.
"Supreme Court Takes Case on
Background Checks"
Nola's Employment Law Blog
March 16, 2010
Lisa Guerin
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a
case challenging the federal government's
background check process. (The case is
called National Aeronautics and Space
Administration v. Nelson .... )
The underlying challenge was raised by a
group of scientists, engineers, and
administrative support employees who
worked at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL), a research lab run by NASA and the
California Institute of Technology. The
employees were officially employed by
CalTech. Following a policy change in
2007, all JPL employees whom the
government categorized as "low risk" (they
didn't have access to classified material) had
to submit to the background check
procedures routinely applied to federal civil
service employees in order to maintain their
access to the JPL. The employees filed a
lawsuit and sought a preliminary injunction
to stop the new policy from going into effect
until the court had a chance to decide
whether it was constitutional.
The background check-called the
Nationwide Agency Check with Inquiries
(NACI)-requires employees to provide
information on their residential, education,
employment, and military histories; give
references; and disclose any use of illegal
drugs in the past year, along with any
treatment or counseling received.
Employees must also sign a release form
allowing the government to collect
information from landlords, employers, and
references on a wide variety of topics,
including "financial integrity," "mental or
emotional stability," and "general behavior
or conduct."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the government on several issues.
However, the Court found that the
employees were entitled to a preliminary
injunction because they had raised serious
questions as to whether their constitutional
right to informational privacy was violated
by the question asking about drug treatment
or counseling and by the release form (and
subsequent inquiries it authorized). NASA
petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the
case, and the Court agreed to do so earlier
this month.
This case challenges background checks
applicable to government employees and
contractors. The U.S. Constitution protects
only against action by the government (in
this case, NASA's decision that JPL
employees had to pass a background check),
not actions by private companies and
employers. So, while the outcome of the
case could be hugely significant to federal
sector employees, who have been subject to
these same background check requirements
for decades, it won't be directly applicable
to those who work in the private sector.
However, state courts often follow the
Supreme Court's lead and guidelines in
deciding cases alleging violations of
privacy, even though the right to privacy
applicable in those cases generally comes
from a state constitution, statute, or case
law, not the U.S. Constitution.
Private sector employees could be more
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directly affected by some of the background
check developments reported on this week
by SHRM [Society for Human Resource
Management]. SHRM reports that the EEOC
is considering issuing new enforcement
guidance explaining when employers may
consider an applicant's credit history and
arrest and conviction record in the hiring
process. The EEOC has long stated that
using credit reports and criminal records to
disqualify applicants could have a disparate
impact based on race; if so, the employer
would have to show that the practice is job-
related and consistent with business
necessity. SHRM offers some tips that will
help employers avoid legal trouble when
performing background checks, including
that employers should be selective in
deciding which positions require a
background check and should allow
applicants to explain negative information
that turns up.
"High Court to Hear Background-Screening Case"
Human Resource Executive Online
April 1, 2010
Kristen B. Frasch
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
a background-screening case involving
federal contractors at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory that could have far-
reaching implications for all employers,
federal and private, according to one
attorney familiar with the case.
The case, NASA vs. Nelson, involves a
group of 28 scientists, engineers and
administrative personnel-including lead
plaintiff Robert Nelson-working at the
NASA facility, which is operated by the
California Institute of Technology in
Pasadena, Calif., under contract with NASA.
It's known for developing satellites, rockets,
spacecraft and telescopes.
The plaintiffs claim NASA's contract with
Caltech-which was modified in 2007 to
require background screening tests as a
condition of being allowed access to the
facility-violates their rights to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment, the Privacy
Act and a constitutional right to
informational privacy.
Though a federal district court judge
rejected their initial motion for a preliminary
injunction to block the background
investigations and ruled for NASA, the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said the
questions asked in the investigations
threatened the constitutional rights of
workers and NASA should be blocked from
continuing the checks.
The space agency, backed by the Obama
administration, appealed that decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court, asking that the
temporary restraining order the appeals
court placed on the checks be dissolved and
the checks be allowed to continue.
What the high court ultimately decides could
affect how the federal government
investigates the backgrounds of all current
and future employees. It could also easily
serve as precedent for the private sector as
well, says Pamela Devata, partner in the
labor and employment practice group of
Chicago-based Seyfarth Shaw and a former
member of the National Association of
Professional Background Screeners.
In addition to deciding whether the
laboratory workers' rights to privacy were
violated by the checks, one of the issues the
court may consider is whether the
background questions asked of federal
contractors must be specifically related to
the job. Currently, there is no federal law
saying information secured from a
background screener must relate to the
specific job a federal contractor is applying
for or carrying out.
"If the Supreme Court justices come out and
say, 'When you're doing a background
check for a federal contractor, the check
must relate to the job specifically,' that
could even go beyond the jurisdiction of
federal contractors and have immediate
bearing in private-sector cases," Devata
says. "It would be an easy step to take. It's
just a little 'hop-over.'
In the case of the plaintiffs, nearly all have
worked at the Caltech facility for many
years and are considered low-risk, i.e., none
of them work on top-secret projects. In their
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lawsuit, they claim the investigations go
well beyond what is appropriate for the
work they do-including probes into
medical records and interviews with friends
and family about their finances and even
their sex lives.
NASA, in its petition to the Supreme Court,
says the forms "are the same ones that have
long been used to conduct background
checks for applicants for federal
employment."
"The ramifications of the [appeals court]
decision are potentially dramatic," the
government and NASA state in the petition.
"The decision prevents the routine
background checks of many government-
contract employees and it casts a
constitutional cloud over the background-
check process the government has used for
federal and civil-service employees for over
50 years."
The San Francisco-based appeals court's
ruling, however, says the forms NASA-via
Caltech-required the laboratory workers to
fill out sought "highly personal information
using an open-ended technique including
asking for 'any adverse information which.
. . may have a bearing on this person's
suitability for government employment."'
"There is nothing 'narrowly tailored' about
such a broad inquisition," the ruling states.
The Caltech case, says Devata, also raises
"sort of a joint-employer issue . . . a very,
very hot topic right now for background
screeners." Conflicts arise regularly in
public and private sectors, she says, over
contracts that specify one agency's or
organization's jurisdiction over someone,
but aren't clear about the roles of other
agencies or companies involved in the work
being done.
"Some might claim a contract is clear," she
says, "but that doesn't prevent other parties
from arguing that they have jurisdiction. It's
a really interesting dilemma. When this case
first came out, it was huge, hot news
because of this."
Though Caltech was dismissed from the
case by the 9th Circuit District Court, a
statement released through its media
relations and online communications office
says the school will "continue to follow the
case closely."
"We have and will abide by the orders
issued by the courts," the statement reads.
Calls and e-mails to NASA seeking
comment were not returned.
The arguments that will be brought before
the Supreme Court in its upcoming term,
beginning in October, will be closely
watched, says Devata, particularly anything
that addresses job-relatedness.
"The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission is all over this," she says. "This
is a huge and very hot topic right now
among background screeners. The EEOC
has already said there needs to be job-
relatedness in background checks. So it
wouldn't surprise me if the Supreme Court
says, 'What's asked of an employee or
potential employee must be related to the
job, so then, the question becomes, 'What is
job-related? What does job-related mean?'
"Realistically," she says, "I can see the
Supreme Court saying these are things that
must be looked at and addressed by the
federal legislators who are allowing these
people to be contractors," which would
return the case to the lower federal courts to
decide.
"Frankly, this is just another weight on the
scale in terms of when you are evaluating
what background checks to run and what
information to gather, and how you should
gather and what you should be gathering,"
Devata says.
What she and her firm tell clients-many of
them HR executives-is to "absolutely do
background checks," she says. "People do
lie on their applications. In this economy,
people want jobs, so people are willing to
fabricate or lie....
"But know what checks you're getting and
make sure you're getting your information
from an accurate source, one you know is
committed to compliance" with the latest
laws and rulings-including what NASA vs.
Nelson may add to the mix. "There are
many, many valid and conscientious
background screeners," she says, adding that
employers would be well-advised to go
through the NAPBS.
When considering using a vendor or
background-screening provider, she adds, "I
think you have to ask them what their
policies for complying with the Federal
Credit Reporting Act and other laws are. Be
very clear in asking, 'What information are
you providing me?'
"Having clear communication with
background screeners is one of the biggest
challenges I have witnessed for HR."
Ortiz v. Jordan
09-737
Ruling Below: Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. App'x 449 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 2010 U.S.
LEXIS 3524 (2010).
Ortiz, a former inmate, brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, Jordan and Bright,
alleging that she was sexually assaulted by a prison guard while incarcerated and that the
officials failed to protect her and retaliated against her for reporting the incident. The district
court entered judgment for Ortiz. The officials then appealed the court's denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The court of appeals held that the case manager, Jordan,
acted reasonably and was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the
investigator, Bright, was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not violate Ortiz's due
process rights. The case was remanded.
Question Presented: May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial
on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?
Michelle ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Paula JORDAN and Rebecca Bright, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed March 12, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:
Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, brought a §
1983 claim against various prison officials
alleging that, while incarcerated, she was
sexually assaulted by a prison guard on two
successive nights and that prison officials
failed to protect her from the second assault.
She also claimed that prison officials
retaliated against her for reporting the
incident. The jury found in favor of the
former inmate and against two prison
officials, Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.
The prison officials appealed. For the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that
both Jordan and Bright are entitled to
qualified immunity.
I.
The evidence, as reflected by the jury's
verdict and, therefore, viewed on appeal in
the light most favorable to Ortiz, established
that at the time of the events at issue in this
case, Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate at the
Ohio Reformatory for Women, was serving
a one-year sentence for aggravated assault in
the stabbing of her husband, apparently in
retaliation for multiple incidents of domestic
violence to which she had been subjected
over a period of several years. While
incarcerated, she was sexually assaulted by a
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corrections officer, Douglas Schultz, on two
successive nights. Ortiz testified that the
first assault occurred on Friday, November
8, 1996 in her living quarters at the JG
Cottage. Schultz, who reportedly had a habit
of being "overly friendly" and "touching
people," walked up behind Ortiz while she
was alone in the washroom and grabbed her
shoulder. Ortiz said, "Oh, are you giving me
a back rub?" and Schultz replied, "No, that's
not what I was reaching for" and grabbed
her breast. Upset, Ortiz told him to get away
from her. After a brief verbal altercation,
Schultz complied, but later that night he told
Ortiz, "I'll get you tomorrow, watch."
The next day, Saturday, November 9, 1996,
Ortiz approached another corrections
officer, Steve Hall, and told him that Schultz
had assaulted her the night before. Hall
immediately took Ortiz to see the acting
case manager for the JG Cottage, Paula
Jordan. Hall testified that when he dropped
Ortiz off at Jordan's office, he told Jordan
what Ortiz had told him, including the name
of the officer in question, but did not stay
because his shift was about to end.
Despite the fact that Ortiz was crying and
obviously upset, Jordan told her that it was
Schultz's last day at the JG Cottage because
of a previously planned reassignment to
another correctional facility. Although
Jordan said that "no one has the right to
touch you," she also told Ortiz to "keep in
mind that the man was leaving," that "this
was his nature," and that he "is just an old
dirty man." Jordan encouraged Ortiz to
"hang out with [her] friends" for the rest of
the day so that Schultz would not have the
chance to be alone with her. Ortiz explained
at trial that upon learning from Jordan that it
was Schultz's last day, she decided not to
file a complaint but instead just to "let it go"
and get through Schultz's last day by
following Jordan's suggestion that she use
what amounted to a buddy system. Jordan
also told Ortiz that "if anything happens"
again, she could report it on Tuesday, when
Jordan returned to work.
The second assault occurred later on
Saturday, the same day that Ortiz had
spoken with Jordan. Ortiz testified that she
was feeling ill, went to her room, and
subsequently fell asleep. Although there
were three other people in the room with
Ortiz when she went to sleep, they were
gone when she woke up and found Schultz
standing over her, one hand fondling her
breast and the other in her "crotch area"
inside her underwear. When she realized
what was occurring, Ortiz raised a ruckus,
hitting and scratching Schultz until he left
the room.
The written statement that Ortiz submitted
regarding the second assault reported that
Schultz "fluttered his fingers across my left
breast [and] smoothed across my blanket on
my crotch area." She later testified that
Schultz had succeeded in "putting his
fingers inside [her]," saying that it upset her
to the point that she asked Jordan whether
"[she] needed to put it in" the written
statement and was told to refer simply to
contact with "the crotch area."
The day after the second assault, Sunday,
November 10, 1996, Ortiz told Officer Hall
that Schultz had "touched [her] again," and
Hall took her to the sergeant's office to
report the incident. As a result, the matter
was referred to institutional investigator
Rebecca Bright, who received a call about
the incident on Sunday but, because she was
told that Schultz had just been transferred
and was no longer assigned to the facility,
did not actually begin an investigation until
Monday. During the course of that
investigation, Bright met with Ortiz and
other relevant persons, including Officer
Schultz, collected relevant documents, and
scheduled a lie detector test for Ortiz, which
Ortiz "passed."
Ortiz's claim against Jordan stemmed at
least in part from Bright's conclusion that
Jordan had violated the standards of
employee conduct by failing to turn in the
incident report promptly. Bright testified at
trial that if Jordan had reported the first
incident immediately, "the proper people
would have taken a role in protecting Ms.
Ortiz." As for Officer Schultz, although he
initially denied any wrongdoing, he
voluntarily resigned his position. Bright
explained that this event effectively ended
her investigation because her administrative
role was limited to investigating employee
misconduct.
Ortiz's claim against Bright emanated from
Bright's recommendation early in her
investigation that Ortiz be placed in
"security control." As a result, on the
Tuesday after the assault, Ortiz was
transferred to the "ARN Unit," otherwise
referred to by the inmates as "the hole,"
where she was put into solitary confinement.
Bright later testified that she had warned
Ortiz several times not to speak about the
investigation with other inmates, indicating
in her final warning to Ortiz that this was a
"direct order." When she received reports
that Ortiz was still discussing the
investigation with other inmates, Bright
recommended to the warden that Ortiz be
placed in "security control," and the warden
approved the action. Bright explained that
this gag order was intended both to protect
the integrity of the investigation and to
protect Ortiz from possible altercations with
other prisoners who were loyal to Schultz.
But Bright also attributed her action to
compliance with Ohio Administrative Code
§ 5120-9-11, a provision that provides for
the placement of an inmate in isolation prior
to a hearing for investigation if there is a
threat of disruption to the institution. Ortiz
was taken in handcuffs and shackled to a
location that she described as lacking
adequate bedding, heating, and clothing.
Ortiz alleges that Bright's motive for placing
her in "the hole" was purely punitive rather
than protective, recalling that Bright told her
that she was being put into the hole "because
[she] had lied." Ortiz also testified that after
a day in solitary confinement, Bright called
her back into her office, asked her to change
her statement, and said, "[A]re you ready to
tell me the story again?" When Ortiz
responded she had already told her the story,
Bright said, "[A]re you ready to tell me the
truth?" Ortiz replied that she had already
told the truth and began crying. Bright's
reaction was to tell Ortiz, "[I]f you are going
to cry, I am going to have to take you back
to the hole right now." Within two days of
this confrontation, a psychologist at the
facility called Bright, told her that Ortiz was
"not really handling the ARN complex very
well," and was ill and vomiting. Ortiz was
moved to the infirmary that day, on the
recommendation of the psychologist, and
she remained there for a week before being
transferred back to her regular room in the
JG Cottage.
Ortiz filed this § 1983 action against Jordan,
Bright, Schultz, Warden Shirley Rogers, and
Ohio Governor George Voinovich, alleging,
among other claims, an Eighth Amendment
violation by Jordan for failing to protect
Ortiz and a due process claim violation by
Bright for placing her in solitary
confinement. When Schultz could not be
served with process, he was dismissed from
this action. The remaining four defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment
denying liability and claiming qualified
immunity. Ortiz filed a brief in opposition to
the motion, in which she requested that "the
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
be denied as it pertains to defendant Paula
Jordan" but did not mention the other three
defendants. The district court denied
summary judgment on the Eighth
Amendment claim against Jordan and the
due process claims against Bright and
Warden Rogers, but dismissed all other
claims. The district court also denied
qualified immunity to the remaining
defendants, but the defendants did not file an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of
qualified immunity.
Before the case reached trial, Warden
Rogers died, leaving only two defendants,
Jordan and Bright. The jury awarded Ortiz
$250,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages against
Jordan and $25,000 in compensatory
damages and $250,000 in punitive damages
against Bright. The district court entered
judgment in Ortiz's favor based on those
verdicts. Jordan and Bright now appeal the
verdict and the award of damages in Ortiz's
favor. Both contend that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
II.
A.
Although courts normally do not review the
denial of a summary judgment motion after
a trial on the merits, denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is an
exception to this rule and, just as in
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity,
the standard of review is de novo. To
determine whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity, we must first determine
as a threshold matter whether, considering
the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a constitutional right was violated
and, if so, whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the violation.
1.
"[A] prison official cannot be found liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying an
inmate humane conditions of confinement
unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference." "But an
official's failure to alleviate a significant
risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation,
cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of punishment."
Jordan contends that she did not violate
Ortiz's Eighth Amendment rights because
she was not "deliberately indifferent" to the
substantial danger that Schultz posed to
Ortiz. She cites, for example, her advice to
Ortiz to use the buddy system as evidence
that although she may have been negligent,
she was not "deliberately indifferent." In
support of this position, Jordan relies on
Marsh v. Am, a case in which we upheld the
grant of qualified immunity to a prison
official who took some steps to protect an
inmate from threats by another inmate, even
though the prison official did not believe the
threat was serious.
Here, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Ortiz, Ortiz reported the first
encounter with Schultz to Jordan on the
afternoon of Saturday, November 9, 1996,
the day after it occurred. Jordan was made
aware of Schultz's identity. There is no
evidence that Jordan knew that Schultz had
said that he would "get [Ortiz] tomorrow."
Jordan told Ortiz that nobody had a right to
touch her and that Ortiz could report the
incident. Jordan asked Ortiz what she
wanted to do. Jordan also told Ortiz that the
day on which Ortiz spoke to Jordan was
Schultz's last day at the institution. She told
Ortiz to keep this in mind and that Schultz
was "just an old dirty man." Jordan
suggested that Ortiz stay with her friends for
the rest of the day so that Schultz would not
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have an opportunity to be alone with her.
Jordan did not have the authority to reassign
an officer, such as Schultz. Reassignment
required approval of the warden and was
typically initiated at the request of a captain.
Because Ortiz elected not to make a
voluntary statement, Jordan did not bring the
matter to the captain's immediate attention.
Instead, she wrote an "Incident Report"
relating her version of the conversation. She
forgot to place the report in the mailbox
outside the warden's office when she left
work on Saturday. Instead, she turned it in
when she returned to work on Tuesday, the
first business day after a holiday weekend.
Jordan's conduct does not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. Jordan was aware
that Schultz would be at the institution only
a few more hours and suggested a course of
conduct by which Ortiz could effectively
protect herself during that limited time.
Jordan advised Ortiz of her options. She also
wrote an incident report. Given Ortiz's
decision not to proceed to make a voluntary
statement, Jordan did not immediately
approach the captain about a reassignment
for Schultz. These steps were a reasonable
approach to the risk at hand. The fact that
they were ineffective does not change our
analysis. Jordan did not violate Ortiz's
Eighth Amendment rights because she was
not "deliberately indifferent" to the
substantial danger that Schultz posed to
Ortiz. Therefore, Jordan is entitled to
qualified immunity.
ii.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states that a state shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." "The
doctrine that governmental deprivations of
life, liberty or property are subject to
limitations regardless of the adequacy of the
procedures employed has come to be known
as substantive due process."
The Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v.
Conner dooms Ortiz's due process claim
against Bright and ultimately entitles Bright
to qualified immunity. In Sandin, the Court
held that prison regulations affording
prisoners certain procedures before
punishment is imposed create a protected
liberty interest only when the punishment in
question "imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life." The Court
went on to hold that "discipline in
segregated confinement did not present the
atypical, significant deprivation in which a
State might conceivably create a liberty
interest." Similarly, Bright's act of
transferring Ortiz to the ARN Unit did not
constitute a violation of Ortiz's due process
rights because a temporary placement in
solitary confinement is not an "atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Ortiz is correct in pointing out that Sandin
does not sanction the use of solitary
confinement for retaliatory purposes. The
Sandin court itself noted that "[p]risoners..
of course, retain other protection from
arbitrary state action even within the
expected conditions of confinement. They
may invoke the First and Eighth
Amendments and Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment where
appropriate." Ortiz, however, did not stake
her claim on any of these available
provisions. Although Ortiz alleged in her
complaint that Bright placed her in isolation
"with a distinctly punitive purpose,"
arguably invoking a retaliation theory of the
case, it is evident from the language in her
complaint, as well as from the record as a
whole, that her claim was conceived of and
analyzed squarely as a due process violation
and not as a First Amendment retaliation
claim. We cannot reconstitute Ortiz's claim
under a new theory at this stage of the
proceedings. Bright did not violate Ortiz's
due process rights and is entitled to qualified
immunity.
B.
The principal appellate challenge to the
damages award was mounted by Bright,
contending with regard to the jury's verdict
against her that the ten-to-one ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages,
when measured by the "guideposts"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, was so
"grossly excessive" as to violate due
process. That issue has become moot in light
of our determination that Bright cannot be
held liable in this case. Similarly, Jordan's
arguments regarding damages and her
challenges to the district court's evidentiary
rulings are moot.
III.
For the reasons set out above, we reverse
the denial of qualified immunity to both
Bright and Jordan and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DISSENT
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit
Judge, dissenting:
A review of the annual report of dispositions
by this court would reveal that each year we
process several hundred section 1983
actions brought by state and federal prison
inmates scattered throughout the Sixth
Circuit. I would venture to guess that at least
90 percent-and probably even closer to 100
percent-of those cases come to us by way
of summary judgment granted by the district
court and are affirmed on appeal, virtually
out of hand. Almost none of the cases that
we review involves a jury verdict, let alone a
jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff, because
respondents routinely and successfully
invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Indeed, when a district judge does find a
material dispute of fact that prevents a grant
of summary judgment and sends a section
1983 claim to trial, the plaintiff, being an
inmate, is unlikely to arouse the sympathy of
a jury of 12 law-abiding, "free-world" peers.
This, then, is the exceedingly rare instance
in which an inmate's claims not only
survived the prison officials' defense of
qualified immunity but, after a jury trial,
also resulted in a significant monetary award
of damages in the prisoner's favor.
Nevertheless, the majority in this appeal has
managed to extinguish that award by
overturning the jury verdict and finding,
contrary to the decision of the district court,
that the respondents are entitled to qualified
immunity. In view of the uncontested facts
before the district court and the jury, I view
this result as a legal travesty, and I therefore
dissent.
There is arguably room for disagreement
about the liability of Rebecca Bright. The
majority emphasizes what it sees as a flawed
pleading that, in its judgment, prevents the
plaintiffs reliance on a retaliation theory of
recovery. But the majority concedes that she
alleges in her complaint that Bright placed
her in isolation "with a distinctly punitive
purpose." Hence, the majority's basis for
rejecting the retaliation claim seems hyper-
technical at the very least. Equally
unpersuasive is the majority's endorsement
of Bright's invocation of Ohio
Administrative Code § 5120-9-11,
governing "security control and disciplinary
control," as justification for Ortiz's transfer
to isolation, an action that clearly affected
her adversely. Even a superficial reading of
that administrative code section reveals that
the authority to isolate an inmate pending
investigation of a rule violation applies to
the rule violator, not the victim of the
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violation, to the inmate threatening
disruption, not the inmate who has suffered
from disruption during his or her
incarceration. We have in the record a prison
psychologist's report that Ortiz was "not
handling [isolation in] the ARN complex
very well" and was ill and vomiting, as well
as prison records showing that she spent the
following week in the prison infirmary
recovering from the ill-effects of Bright's
order relegating Ortiz to "the hole,"
purportedly for discussing the assaults that
she had endured with other inmates.
Viewing this evidence in the light most
favorable to Ortiz, it seems evident that
Bright's action could reasonably be found
by a jury to constitute illegal retaliation.
But if there is any room for disagreement
about Bright's liability in this case, there is
none at all concerning Jordan's liability,
because it was her deliberate indifference to
a known risk to Ortiz that made the second
assault by Douglas Schultz possible, if not
inevitable. Ironically, the majority opinion
that robs Ortiz of her victory before the jury
also proves her case ....
Significantly, rather than intervene in some
reasonable way on Saturday, Jordan reported
the situation to no one, instead leaving Ortiz
with instructions to rely on a makeshift
"buddy system" for protection from
Schultz---one that proved to be sadly
inadequate, as it turned out. Equally
significant was Bright's testimony at trial
that "if Jordan had reported the first incident
immediately, 'the proper people would have
taken a role in protecting Mrs. Ortiz'." But,
leaving an inmate such as Ortiz wholly
unprotected in the face of a known risk of an
assault has repeatedly been held by this
court and others to amount to deliberate
indifference sufficient to establish liability
under section 1983.
The jury credited Ortiz's testimony, as well
as that presented in her behalf, and we are
charged to review the record in the light
most favorable to her. Although the
majority's opinion sets out facts that
obviously support the plaintiffs claims,
those facts appear to carry no weight or
substance with the majority. Moreover, the
majority pays no discernible deference to the
fact that the judgment in this case rests on a
jury verdict. Given the legal posture of this
case and the strength of the evidence against
defendants Bright and Jordan, the majority's
decision to overturn the jury's verdict strikes
me not just as an unfortunate result in this
case, but as one that is thoroughly senseless.
I therefore dissent.
"High Court to Rule on Summary
Judgment Appeals"
Law360
April 26, 2010
Ryan Davis
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to take
up the question of whether an order denying
summary judgment can be appealed after
trial if the party did not appeal the order
before trial, in a case involving the alleged
sexual assault of a female inmate at an Ohio
prison. [The case is Ortiz v. Jordan.]
The high court on Monday granted a petition
for certiorari by the woman's counsel, who
argued that there is a split among federal
circuit courts on the question of whether a
denial of summary judgment can be
appealed after a full trial, with some courts
barring such appeals and others allowing
them when they are based on legal grounds.
The cert petition stated that the circuits are
also divided on whether such appeals are
permissible if the party didn't bring an
interlocutory appeal. The former inmate's
case, the petition stated, presents the
opportunity to resolve the question of when,
if ever, denial of a summary judgment
motion can be appealed.
The cert petition argued that allowing post-
trial reviews of summary judgment
undercuts fundamental tenets of federal
procedure.
Allowing such appeals undermines both
motions for judgment as a matter of law, by
rewarding parties who fail to file them to
preserve summary judgment issues, and the
process for certifying issues of law for
pretrial appeal, the motion argues, and also
diminishes the discretion of district courts.
The case arose out of a 1996 incident at the
Ohio Reformatory for Women, where
inmate Michelle Ortiz was allegedly
sexually assaulted by a corrections officer
on two consecutive nights, according to the
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit being appealed.
On the first night, the officer, Douglas
Schultz, allegedly grabbed Ortiz's breast,
after which she reported the incident to the
case manager for her living quarters, Paula
Jordan. Jordan advised Ortiz that Schultz
was on his last day at the facility and to try
to avoid being alone with him until he left,
the ruling states.
That night, Ortiz awoke to find Schultz
standing over her with his hands on her
breast and down her underwear, and fought
him off, the ruling states.
The case was then referred to institutional
investigator Rebecca Bright, who advised
that Ortiz be put in solitary confinement
because she had discussed the investigation
with other inmates, the ruling states.
Ortiz became sick in solitary and later filed
suit against Jordan and Bright. She alleged
that Jordan failed to protect her from Schultz
and that Bright violated due process by
placing her in solitary.
Jordan and Bright
summary judgment
immunity, which was
court. They did not
appeal of that decision
filed a motion for
claiming qualified
denied by the district
file an interlocutory
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The case then proceeded to trial, where a
jury ruled in favor of Ortiz and awarded her
$625,000. Jordan and Bright appealed,
arguing that they were entitled to qualified
immunity, despite the fact that the lower
court had denied their motion for summary
judgment.
The Sixth Circuit held that while courts do
not normally review the denial of summary
judgment after a trial, the issue of qualified
immunity is an exception.
The appeals court ruled 2-1 that both Jordan
and Bright were entitled to immunity, and
overturned the jury's verdict.
The appeals court ruled that Jordan was not
"deliberately indifferent" to the danger Ortiz
faced from Schultz, and reasonably advised
her to avoid Schultz, entitling Jordan to
immunity.
Likewise, Bright was entitled to immunity,
the court ruled, because Ortiz's rights were
not violated by being placed in solitary since
it was not an "atypical and significant
hardship" compared to ordinary prison life.
Sixth Circuit Judge Martha Craig
Daughtrey, who dissented from the opinion,
described it as "a legal travesty" and
"thoroughly senseless," finding that Jordan's
indifference led to Ortiz's second assault
and that the court's finding of immunity for
Bright was "hyper-technical."
Sixth Circuit Judges Danny J. Boggs and
Julia Smith Gibbons voted to overturn the
verdict.
The Mills Law Office LLC is representing
Ortiz.
The Ohio Attorney General's Office is
representing Jordan and Bright.
The case is Ortiz v. Jordan, case number 09-
737, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
"U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Case Involving Elyria
Woman who Reported Sexual Assault in Prison"
Cleveland Plain Dealer
April 26, 2010
Stephen Koff
The U.S. Supreme Court announced
Monday that it will hear [Ortiz v. Jordan,]
the case of an Elyria woman who won
$625,000 for being punished by Ohio prison
officials after she reported that a guard
sexually assaulted her-only to have the
verdict kicked out because of a disputed
procedural issue.
Michelle Ortiz's legal odyssey has dragged
on for a decade and a half, starting with a
12-month sentence for aggravated assault
after she fought off her physically abusive
husband with a knife. Imprisoned at the
Marysville Correctional Facility for Women,
she was sexually assaulted by a guard on
Nov. 18, 1996.
The next day, she told a different guard
about the assault and was escorted to see a
case manager at the prison. The case
manager told her that the guard who
assaulted her was "just an old dirty man"
who only had one day left before a planned
transfer to another facility, and until then,
she should surround herself with friends at
the prison to keep him away.
But according to court records, the
offending guard assaulted her again that
very night. Ortiz reported the attack-and
soon was admonished by an institutional
investigator for telling others about the
incidents. Three days after the second attack,
Ortiz was put in solitary confinement.
She later sued for violation of her rights.
The case manager and institutional
investigator tried to get the case dismissed
on the grounds that they had "qualified
immunity" from lawsuits because they were
state employees and only doing their jobs.
Their legitimate duties, their attorneys said
during court proceedings, included
protecting Ortiz from inmates loyal to the
guard by putting her in isolation, and
preserving the integrity of the investigation
by keeping claims about the attacks from
spreading in the prison.
A judge was not persuaded, refusing to
dismiss the case, and the trial started. A jury
awarded Ortiz $625,000 in damages. The
case manager and institutional investigator
then appealed and last year won a reversal
before the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
which ruled two-to-one against Ortiz.
But this appeal was not about the trial
verdict or monetary award. Rather, the
prison employees contended that the trial
judge was wrong not to dismiss the case
earlier because, they said, they should have
been granted immunity from the suit.
Lawyers for Ortiz contend otherwise, and
say that if prison officials were so sure of
their right to immunity, they should have
appealed on that point before allowing the
case to go to a full trial. Instead, they
gambled that they could win during the trial,
and only after that failed did they try to
resurrect their claimed immunity right, says
David Eduard Mills, the Cleveland-based
attorney who filed the Supreme Court case.
Federal and state appeals courts have
disagreed on this point in other cases, Mills
said, and the Supreme Court has a chance to
settle the matter. Indirectly, it would affect
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the Ortiz verdict. But the high court case
isn't about that. It's about whether lawyers
who lose procedural points before a trial
must appeal on those points right away, or
whether they can roll the dice at a chance of
winning the trial itself, making the
procedural appeal unnecessary.
"Court to Hear Appeal in Guard's
Sexual Assault"
The Associated Press
April 27, 2010
The Supreme Court has agreed to consider
reinstating a $625,000 judgment against
Ohio prison officials who did nothing to
prevent a guard's sexual assault of an inmate
and then punished the victim. [The case is
Ortiz v. Jordan and Bright.]
The justices said Monday they will review a
federal appeals court that threw out the
award to Michelle Ortiz. The lower court
had said the prison officials did not violate
her constitutional rights. Another federal
judge called the appellate decision a "legal
travesty."
Ortiz was serving 12 months at the Ohio
Reformatory for Women in November 2002
when she reported that a male guard fondled
her breasts and warned, "I'll get you
tomorrow, watch." He did, returning when
Ortiz was asleep to molest her again.
When Ortiz discussed the attacks with other
inmates, she was shackled and sent to
solitary confinement. She won a jury
verdict.
But the appeals court in Cincinnati found by
a 2-1 vote that one official, Paula Jordan,
could not be held liable even though she did
not take immediate action when Ortiz
reported the first incident. The court said the
other official, Rebecca Bright, did not
violate Ortiz's rights by sending her to
solitary confinement.
Bright and Jordan tried to get the case
against them dismissed before the trial. A
judge refused to do so and they did not
appeal then. The legal issue in the case is
whether they could wait until after the trial
to appeal the judge's ruling.
It is extremely rare for a prison inmate's
civil rights complaint to overcome
preliminary legal obstacles and persuade a
jury there was a violation, said Judge Martha
Craig Daughtrey, the dissenting appeals
court judge.
Given the statistics, Daughtrey said, "I view
this result as a legal travesty."
The evidence against Bright and Jordan was
strong, she said. "The majority's decision to
overturn the jury's verdict strikes me not
just as an unfortunate result in this case, but
as one that is thoroughly senseless."
Arguments will take place in the fall.
The Associated Press normally does not
name victims of alleged sexual abuse. In this
case, her attorney, David E. Mills of
Cleveland, said she could be identified
publicly.
The case is Ortiz v. Jordan and Bright, 09-
737.
"Panel Sets Guidelines for
Fighting Prison Rape"
The Washington Post
June 23, 2009
Carrie Johnson
Nearly six years after President George W.
Bush signed legislation to reduce prison
rape, a blue-ribbon commission is calling on
corrections officers to identify vulnerable
inmates, offer better medical care and allow
stricter monitoring of their facilities.
The National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission, in a study to be released today,
affirms that more than 7.3 million people in
prisons, jails and halfway houses across the
nation have "fundamental rights to safety,
dignity and justice."
The number of rapes committed by
detention staff members and other inmates
remains a subject of intense scrutiny. A
2007 survey of state and federal prisoners
estimated that 60,500 inmates had been
abused the previous year. But experts say
that the stigma of sexual assault often leads
to underreporting of incidents and denial by
many of the victims.
Too often, the report says, sexual abuse of
prisoners is viewed as a source of jokes
rather than a problem with destructive
implications for public health, crime rates
and successful reentry of prisoners into the
community.
"If you have a zero-tolerance policy on
prison rape and it is known from the highest
ranks that this will not be tolerated and there
will be consequences for it, that goes a long
way in sending a message," said U.S District
Judge Reggie B. Walton, the commission
chairman. "Just because people have
committed crimes and are in prison, that
doesn't mean that part of their punishment is
being sexually abused while in detention."
The panel hosted hearings and visited 11
corrections sites before issuing its report.
Among the strongest recommendations:
Staff members should be subject to robust
background checks and given training,
which could help victims of sexual assault
secure emergency medical and mental health
treatment.
Panel members are preparing to send their
report to Attorney General Eric H. Holder
Jr., who will have one year to prepare
mandatory national standards. The
recommendations will not bind state
corrections officers, but states that do not
adopt them will have their criminal justice
funding cut, panel members said.
Jamie Fellner, senior counsel at Human
Rights Watch, said the panel's
recommendations are common-sense steps
to prevent, detect and punish prison rape,
not "pie in the sky" ideals. "This problem
wouldn't exist with good prison
management," Fellner said.
But the recommendations could pose a
challenge for wardens who already battle
crowding. Corrections officers, who
according to inmate surveys commit a
significant percentage of inmate assaults,
also may protest more oversight.
Brenda V. Smith, an American
law professor who worked
commission, said sexual abuse
University
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"isn't just a random event that can happen to
other bad people."
Instead, political protesters, people accused
of driving under the influence of alcohol and
substance abusers have shared harrowing
incidents of rape while in custody,
sometimes while spending only one night
behind bars. "This is something that could
happen to a kid who has no priors and who
happens to make a mistake," Smith added.
Hope Hernandez said in an interview that
she was raped multiple times by a
corrections guard in the District years ago.
She said she was suffering through
withdrawal in a medical unit while she
awaited sentencing on a drug-related charge.
Hemandez said the guard led her to a
secluded room while nurses slept.
Hernandez said she wanted to share her
story to put a face on the problem of rape in
detention facilities.
After her release on probation, she went on
to earn a master's degree in social work. She
said she remains unsettled that the guard's
only punishment was a week-long
suspension. But her work with foster
children and substance abusers and her
attendance at the White House signing
ceremony for the prison rape bill brought
her a measure of peace.
"I'm certainly not bitter over how long it's
taken," Hemandez said of the panel report.
"I think it's great that it's getting any
attention at all."
"DOJ's Holder Defends Delay in
Prison Rape Standards"
The Hill
June 22, 2010
Mike Lillis
The Department of Justice (DoJ) defended
itself Tuesday against those criticizing the
agency for its failure to meet a deadline for
drafting new rules to prevent prison rape.
Under a 2003 law, Wednesday marks the
deadline for the DoJ to finalize those rules-
a deadline the agency isn't planning to meet.
In a letter to several House lawmakers
Tuesday, Attorney General Eric Holder said
the issue remains a priority, but "it is
essential that the Department take the time
necessary to craft regulations that will
endure." Of major concern, Holder wrote to
Reps. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) and Robert
"Bobby" Scott (D-Va.), both long-time
supporters of stricter protections for
prisoners, is the cost to implement the
reforms.
"State and local correctional authorities may
be resistant to adopting new measures, or
may be tempted to cut other programs vital
to protecting inmates and ensuring their
eventual reintegration into society," Holder
wrote. "Assessing such costs, therefore, is a
key part of the Department's efforts."
That defense is hardly news. In March,
Holder told members of a House
appropriations panel that prison officials
were pressuring him to scale back some of
the recommendations of the National Prison
Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC),
the group created by the 2003 law to
examine prison assaults and propose
reforms.
"When I speak to wardens, when I speak to
people who run local jails, when I speak to
people who run state facilities, they look at
me and they say, 'Eric, how are we
supposed to do this?' Holder said at the
time. "If we are going to segregate people,
build new facilities, do training, how are we
supposed to do this?"
Holder used most of Tuesday's five-page
letter to outline the DoJ's steps to rein in
prison assaults under the Obama
administration, including efforts to
strengthen punishments for prison rapes and
help prisons treat victims of sexual assault.
Regarding the national guidelines, however,
the DoJ has yet to propose an amended
timeline for installation.
Considering what's at stake, many
lawmakers and human rights advocates are
wondering why the administration isn't
moving more quickly.
"Delay," said Jamie Fellner, senior counsel
at Human Rights Watch and a member of
the NPREC, "means more people are at risk
of abuse."
Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy v. Reinhard
09-529
Ruling Below: Virginia V. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Va. Office for
Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5088 (2010).
The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (VOPA), a state agency, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief providing it access to peer review records relating to persons who died or
were injured in facilities operated by another state agency. VOPA alleged that the state officials
were violating the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (DD
Act) and the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act) by
denying VOPA access to those records. The district court held that sovereign immunity did not
bar VOPA's suit, but the appellate court reversed. Although Congress could have sought to
provide a federal forum for the action through its abrogation power or by requiring a waiver of
the states' sovereign immunity in exchange for federal funds, Congress had not unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity and the DD Act did not expressly
condition funding under the DD Act and the PAIMI Act on a state's consent to be sued in federal
court. The court declined to expand the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which permitted a private
individual to sue state officials for prospective relief from an ongoing violation of federal law, to
lift the bar of sovereign immunity in federal court where plaintiff was a state agency. VOPA was
permitted to bring an action in state court to obtain the relief that it sought.
Question Presented: Whether the Eleventh Amendment categorically precludes an independent
state agency from bringing an action in federal court against state officials for prospective
injunctive relief to remedy a violation of federal law under the doctrine of Exparte Young.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
James REINHARD, in his official capacity as Commissioner, Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services of the Commonwealth of
Virginia; Denise D. Micheletti, in her official capacity as Director, Central Virginia
Training Center; Charles M. Davis, in his official capacity as Director, Central State
Hospital, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided June 2, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: A state agency known as the Virginia Office
for Protection and Advocacy, or "VOPA,"
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brought this action in federal court against
three Virginia officials in their official
capacities. VOPA claims that the defendant
state officials are violating federal law and
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. We
hold that sovereign immunity bars VOPA's
suit. While Congress could seek to provide a
federal forum for this action through its
abrogation power or by requiring a waiver
of the states' sovereign immunity in
exchange for federal funds, Congress has
attempted neither of those options here. And
we decline to expand the doctrine of Ex
parte Young to lift the bar of sovereign
immunity in federal court when the plaintiff
is a state agency. VOPA may pursue its
claims in state court, but it would be
inconsistent with our system of dual
sovereignty for a federal court to rely on Ex
parte Young to adjudicate an intramural state
dispute like this one. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand this case with directions to dismiss
it.
I.
VOPA is an "independent state agency" in
Virginia that protects and advocates for the
rights of persons with mental illnesses and
developmental disabilities. Congress
encourages the states to create entities like
VOPA by providing federal funding to
protection and advocacy systems that meet
the requirements of two federal statutes: the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 2000 and the Protection
and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental
Illness Act. Under those acts, states may
choose to make their protection and
advocacy systems either public agencies or
private, nonprofit entities. Virginia chose the
public option.
In accordance with the requirements for
receiving federal funds, Virginia law
authorizes VOPA to engage in various
pursuits on behalf of the mentally ill and the
disabled, such as investigating complaints of
discrimination, abuse, and neglect. Two
features of VOPA's authority under Virginia
law are particularly relevant in this case.
First, VOPA operates independently of the
Office of the Attorney General in Virginia
and employs its own legal counsel. Second,
VOPA has the authority, consistent with the
requirements of the DD and PAIMI Acts, to
access "the records of an individual with a
disability" in certain circumstances,
including the situation in which VOPA has
probable cause to believe that a person has
been abused or neglected.
VOPA claims in this action that Virginia is
denying VOPA access to certain records in
violation of the DD and PAIMI Acts. In
particular, VOPA seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief providing it access to "peer
review" records relating to three persons
who died or were injured in facilities for the
mentally ill. The facilities in question are
operated by another state agency in Virginia,
the Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services.
The defendants are three officials in that
department, named in their official
capacities ("the state officials").
Before the district court, the state officials
moved to dismiss VOPA's complaint on two
grounds. First, they argued that VOPA had
failed to state a claim on which relief could
be granted because the state officials were
not violating federal law. Specifically, the
state officials argued that peer review
records were privileged under Virginia law
and that federal regulations under the DD
Act and the PAIMI Act left that state-law
privilege intact. Second, the state officials
argued that Virginia's sovereign immunity
barred VOPA's suit in any event.
The district court denied the state officials'
motion to dismiss on both grounds. First, the
court held that VOPA had stated a claim that
the state officials were violating federal law
and that the state officials' argument based
on the peer review privilege was
inappropriate for resolution on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion because it was an
"affirmative defense to the merits." And
second, the court held that sovereign
immunity did not bar VOPA's suit. The
district court agreed with the state officials
that Congress had not abrogated Virginia's
sovereign immunity, nor had Virginia
waived its sovereign immunity against this
action. However, the court agreed with
VOPA that this suit satisfied the sovereign
immunity exception of Ex parte Young
because VOPA had sued the state officials
for prospective relief from an ongoing
violation of federal law. In reaching that
conclusion, the district court rejected the
state officials' argument that the doctrine of
Ex parte Young did not permit a suit in
federal court by one state agency against
officials of another agency of the same state.
The state officials immediately appealed the
district court's sovereign immunity decision
(and only that decision) under the collateral
order doctrine; our review is de novo.
H.
State sovereign immunity is a bedrock
principle of "Our Federalism." Indeed, the
"central purpose" of the sovereign immunity
doctrine "is to 'accord the States the respect
owed them as' joint sovereigns." When the
Constitution "split the atom of sovereignty,"
the states "did not consent to become mere
appendages of the Federal Government."
Rather, they consented to a system of dual
sovereignty, and the states therefore
"entered the Union 'with their sovereignty
intact."'
Along with their status as sovereigns, the
states retained "the dignity and essential
attributes inhering in that status." And one
of those essential attributes of sovereignty
retained by the states is immunity from suit
absent their consent. While the Eleventh
Amendment reflects this foundational
principle of sovereign immunity, the
Amendment does not define the immunity's
scope.
Exceptions to the states' sovereign
immunity do exist, however. Three of those
exceptions are pertinent here. First,
"Congress may abrogate a State's immunity
pursuant to its enforcement power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Second, a
state may waive its sovereign immunity if it
consents to suit in federal court. Third, the
states' sovereign immunity "does not
preclude private individuals from bringing
suit against State officials for prospective
injunctive or declaratory relief designed to
remedy ongoing violations of federal law."
The parties correctly agree that Virginia's
sovereign immunity bars VOPA's suit
against the state officials in their official
capacities unless one of these exceptions to
sovereign immunity applies. We therefore
examine each of the three relevant
exceptions in turn.
II.
We begin with abrogation. To abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity, Congress must
both "unequivocally express[ ] its intent to
abrogate" and "act[ ] pursuant to a valid
grant of constitutional authority." We agree
with the state officials and the district court
that Congress has not unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate Virginia's
sovereign immunity in this case. Indeed,
VOPA does not argue that Congress has
made any effort, much less a clear one, to
abrogate the states' immunity in the DD Act
or the PAIMI Act. Thus, the abrogation
exception does not permit VOPA's suit
against state officials.
We do not hold, however, that Congress is
powerless to abrogate in the circumstances
presented by this case. Indeed, the Supreme
Court and this court have upheld Congress's
authority to abrogate sovereign immunity
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in certain actions involving the
rights of disabled persons under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act....
IV.
We turn next to the issue of waiver. VOPA
claims that Virginia waived its sovereign
immunity against this action by choosing to
receive federal funding under the DD Act
and the PAIMI Act because Congress
conditioned that funding on the
Commonwealth's consent to be sued in
federal court. In particular, VOPA argues
that the following provision of the DD Act
placed Virginia on notice that it was waiving
its sovereign immunity: "Nothing in this
subchapter shall preclude a system from
bringing a suit on behalf of individuals with
developmental disabilities against a State, or
an agency or instrumentality of a State."
VOPA's waiver argument is not persuasive.
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
the waiver of a state's sovereign immunity
requires an explicit, emphatic statement.
That is, a state waives its immunity from
suit in federal court only where that waiver
is "stated by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implications from the
text as will leave no room for any other
reasonable construction." The purpose of
this "stringent" test is "to be certain that the
State in fact consents to suit." Thus, we will
not find "consent by implication or by use of
ambiguous language."
A state does not waive its sovereign
immunity through its mere receipt of federal
funds or participation in a federal program.
Instead, Congress must also express "a clear
intent to condition participation . . . on a
State's consent to waive its constitutional
immunity." These strict requirements reflect
both the importance of sovereign immunity
in our federal system and the fact that a
waiver of sovereign immunity is "an
exercise, rather than a limitation of, State
sovereignty."
Applying these principles, we agree with the
district court that the provision of the DD
Act cited by VOPA is not sufficiently
explicit to waive Virginia's sovereign
immunity. Indeed, the language in that
provision is far from the emphatic,
"express," and "unequivocal" statement that
is necessary to constitute a waiver. The
district court correctly observed that Section
15044(b)(1) "simply indicates an intent not
to abrogate any preexisting rights to sue."
That section does not, however, provide
states with the necessary notice that they are
consenting to suits in federal court that their
sovereign immunity would otherwise bar.
V.
A.
We turn finally to the doctrine of Ex parte
Young. VOPA argues, and the district court
held, that the Ex parte Young exception to
sovereign immunity permits VOPA's suit
against the state officials in federal court. To
support that argument, VOPA points to
Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Maryland. There, the
Supreme Court held that "[i]n determining
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit"
553
against state officials in their official
capacities, "a court need only conduct a
'straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective."' VOPA
argues that this action satisfies Ex parte
Young under Verizon Maryland's
"straightforward inquiry" because VOPA, in
seeking access to peer review records to
which it is allegedly entitled under the DD
and PAIMI Acts, is pursuing injunctive
relief from an ongoing violation of federal
law by state officials. And, VOPA contends,
that should be the end of the matter.
But it is hardly so simple. While VOPA's
reliance on a straightforward application of
Ex parte Young may have superficial appeal,
this case differs from Ex parte Young in a
critical respect: the plaintiff there was not a
state agency. Instead, the plaintiffs in Ex
parte Young were private parties. And while
no subsequent decision has expressly limited
the application of Ex parte Young to suit by
a private plaintiff, many decisions have
recognized this basic element of the
doctrine.
Moreover, VOPA has cited no case, nor
have we found any, holding that--or even
analyzing whether-the Ex parte Young
doctrine applies equally when the plaintiff is
a state agency. This lack of historical
support for VOPA's suit is important in light
of the Supreme Court's presumption that the
states are immune from proceedings that
were "anomalous and unheard of when the
constitution was adopted."
VOPA argues, however, that its status as a
state agency should not affect our Ex parte
Young analysis. Indeed, VOPA claims that
the identity of the plaintiff is wholly
irrelevant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.
But VOPA cites no authority for that
proposition either....
... [W]e confront a novel question: whether
to expand the Ex parte Young exception to
allow a suit, in federal court, by a state
agency against officials of the same state.
The state officials concede that Ex parte
Young would permit this action if the
plaintiff were a private person, or even a
private protection and advocacy system. The
limited question we face, therefore, is
"whether the Eleventh Amendment bar
should be lifted, as it was in Ex parte
Young," when the plaintiff is a state agency.
B.
When we consider the sovereign interests
and federalism concerns at stake, we are
convinced that the Ex parte Young exception
should not be expanded beyond its
traditional scope to permit a suit by a state
agency against state officials in federal
court. "The preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities." And federal court
adjudication of an "intramural contest"
between a state agency and state officials
encroaches more severely on the dignity and
sovereignty of the states than an Ex parte
Young action brought by a private plaintiff.
The Ex parte Young doctrine rests on the
well-established fiction that a private party's
suit to enjoin state officials from violating
federal law is not a suit against the state. An
action by a state agency against state
officials in federal court, by contrast, has no
similar historical pedigree, and it would be a
more obvious affront to a state's sovereign
interests. Indeed, the infringement on a
state's sovereign dignity would be
substantial if a state agency, acting
unilaterally, could force other state officials
to appear before a federal tribunal. We
therefore see no reason to extend the Ex
parte Young doctrine to allow such a suit.
Splintering a state's internal authority in this
manner would be antithetical to our system
of dual sovereignty. After all, "[t]he Framers
split the atom of sovereignty"-they did not
shatter it.
In contrast to the expansion of Ex parte
Young proposed by VOPA, the interest of
the states in avoiding excessive federal
meddling with their internal authority is well
recognized in the Supreme Court's
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. In Alden
v. Maine, for example, the Supreme Court
held that Congress did not have the power
under Article I to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity in their own courts. The
Court recognized that if Congress had such a
power, the federal government would be
able "to turn the State against itself and
ultimately to commandeer the entire
political machinery of the State against its
will." The Court renounced "[s]uch plenary
federal control of state governmental
processes" because it would "denigrate[ ]
the separate sovereignty of the States."
Moreover, Alden recognized that for the
federal government to "assert[ I authority
over a State's most fundamental political
processes" would "strike[ ] at the heart of
the political accountability so essential to
our liberty and republican form of
government."
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court held
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman that Ex parte Young did not
permit suits in federal court to enjoin state
officials from violating state law. The
Supreme Court in Pennhurst sought to avoid
the significant "intrusion on state
sovereignty" that would result "when a
federal court instructs state officials on how
to conform their conduct to state law." That
is, the Court recognized that federal court
resolution of internal state disputes would
"conflict[] directly with the principles of
federalism that underlie the Eleventh
Amendment."
The reasoning of Alden and Pennhurst is
persuasive here. VOPA seeks to expand Ex
parte Young to allow a federal court, without
the imprimatur of Congress or the consent of
the state, to resolve a dispute between a state
agency and state officials. Recognizing an
inherent power in the federal courts to settle
this sort of internecine feud-"to turn the
State against itself'-would disparage the
status of the states as sovereigns. Moreover,
just as Pennhurst observed that states and
their officials have an interest against
appearing in federal court over issues of
state law, states have a similar interest in not
having a federal court referee contests
between their agencies. Further, allowing a
state agency to decide on its own accord to
sue officials of another state agency and to
obtain relief from an Article III judge would
create difficult questions of political
accountability. Where exactly could citizens
dissatisfied with the outcome of such a
federal court case turn for political redress?
The answer is not obvious. For these
reasons, granting a federal forum to "a
state's warring factions" based on alleged
violations of federal law would be an
unwarranted extension of Ex parte Young.
C.
VOPA insists, however, that this action does
not actually implicate any special sovereign
interests on the part of Virginia. Instead,
VOPA argues that this suit, like all Ex parte
Young actions, is primarily about enforcing
federal law. VOPA points out that Virginia
accepted federal funds under the DD Act
and the PAIMI Act and created VOPA to
enforce the accompanying requirements of
those statutes. And VOPA argues that
Virginia and its officials therefore have no
sovereign interest in avoiding VOPA's use
of Ex parte Young. In other words: "This is
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not, as the state officials mischaracterize it,
simply an intramural contest between state
agencies. . . .[T]he question is whether the
state officials are required to comply with
federal law."
These arguments are unpersuasive as well.
As an initial matter, VOPA's emphasis on
the enforcement of federal law proves too
much. The Supreme Court in Alden
specifically rejected the "contention that
substantive federal law by its own force
necessarily overrides the sovereign
immunity of the States." Instead, the Court
held that even federal law must be applied
"in a manner consistent with the
constitutional sovereignty of the States."
Indeed, if a federal claim alone were enough
to invoke Ex parte Young, many of the
Supreme Court's cases, including Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, would have been wrongly
decided.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized in cases related to the political
subdivisions of the states that alleging a
violation of federal law does not itself
override the states' interest in maintaining
their sovereignty with respect to internal
state conflicts. These cases demonstrate that
the parties to a dispute matter in deciding
whether a federal forum is available.
To be specific, the Supreme Court has held
repeatedly that political subdivisions of
states could not obtain relief under federal
law against the application of state statutes,
even where the political subdivisions
claimed that the state laws in question
violated the federal constitution. In City of
Trenton, for example, Trenton challenged-
under the Contract Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment-a New Jersey
statute imposing a fee on the city for
withdrawing water from the Delaware River.
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge
because Trenton, as a "creature of the State.
. . subject to the sovereign will" could not
"invoke such restraints upon the power of
the State." And in Williams, the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge brought by the
cities of Baltimore and Annapolis on
constitutional grounds against a Maryland
statute, holding that "[a] municipal
corporation, created by a state for the better
ordering of government, has no privileges or
immunities under the federal constitution
which it may invoke in opposition to the will
of its creator."
Sovereign immunity was not at issue in
these political subdivision cases. But these
decisions are nonetheless relevant to our
sovereign immunity inquiry because the
Court made clear that, even in the presence
of an alleged violation of federal law, the
nature of the party making the federal claim
implicated the state's interest in keeping its
internal authority intact. Moreover, the
Court demonstrated, consistently and
emphatically, its unwillingness to override
the states' control of their own internal
disputes.
D.
VOPA also argues that denying it access to
federal court will lead to inconsistent
application of substantive protections for
persons with disabilities. For example,
VOPA claims that "federal law [will] apply
differently" in different jurisdictions because
private protection and advocacy systems in
other states, unlike VOPA, will be able to
sue state officials in federal court. VOPA
also argues that, within Virginia, disabled
persons in public facilities will "not enjoy
the same protections under federal law" as
disabled persons in private facilities if
VOPA cannot sue the state officials in
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federal court.
These concerns are illusory. The state
officials concede, and VOPA does not
dispute, that VOPA may bring this suit in
state court and obtain the same relief that it
seeks here. Specifically, the parties agree
that at a minimum Virginia's sovereign
immunity would not bar an original action
by VOPA for a writ of mandamus brought in
the Virginia Supreme Court. And in such a
suit, the Supremacy Clause requires Virginia
courts to enforce federal law. VOPA is
therefore incorrect to argue that our decision
will cause any discrepancies in the
application of substantive federal law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has the
authority to review decisions by state courts
on matters of federal law without regard to
sovereign immunity.
E.
Finally, VOPA argues that denying it access
to federal court based on Virginia's
sovereign interests is inconsistent with state
law. VOPA points out that Virginia law
designates VOPA as an independent agency.
For example, VOPA operates independently
of the Office of the Attorney General in
Virginia and can retain its own legal
counsel. Because Virginia has exercised its
sovereignty in making VOPA an
independent entity under state law, VOPA
suggests that Virginia cannot invoke its
sovereign interests to complain when VOPA
uses that independence to sue Virginia's
officials in federal court under Ex parte
Young.
This argument is erroneous. While Virginia
did grant VOPA some independence under
state law, that limited independence in no
way implies that Virginia granted VOPA the
authority to sue the Commonwealth or its
officials in federal court. Indeed, VOPA
does not point to any provision of state law
to that effect. "A State's constitutional
interest in immunity encompasses not
merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued." Thus, we interpret VOPA's
independence to suggest only what the state
officials have conceded in this case-that
VOPA can bring this suit in state court.
Furthermore, VOPA's argument based on its
independence has the problem of being
potentially limitless. Many other state
entities have features of independence. For
example, the State Corporation Commission
in Virginia is a state agency that also has the
authority to hire its own legal counsel
outside of the Attorney General's office.
And public universities in Virginia are
governed by boards that have the same
powers as corporations and that are subject
to the control of the General Assembly. If
we were to adopt VOPA's position, these
state entities and countless others might
suddenly possess the authority to pursue Ex
parte Young actions against other state
officials. After all, nearly every state agency
receives federal funding and must comply
with federal law of some sort, so under
VOPA's argument, nearly every state
agency would be subject to an Ex parte
Young suit by another supposedly
independent arm of the state. As we have
learned from experience, an exception like
the one VOPA proposes, given time, tends
to expand far beyond its original scope.
There is no telling where that expansion
might end here, and we are not disposed to
find out.
VI.
VOPA's argument ultimately boils down to
the claim that, if VOPA is to maximize its
effectiveness in representing the federal
rights of persons with disabilities and mental
illnesses, VOPA should be able to bring this
suit in federal court. We express no view on
that claim. We hold only that, because
VOPA is a state agency, Ex parte Young is
the improper vehicle for VOPA to gain
access to a federal forum. This holding in no
way limits the scope of Ex parte Young for
private plaintiffs. We also do not hold that
Congress lacks the authority to grant VOPA
access to federal court-indeed, Congress
could attempt to abrogate the states'
immunity from suit or seek a waiver of that
immunity in return for federal funds. And
for now, VOPA can enforce federal law in
state court, where we have no reason to
think that VOPA will not find a just
resolution of its claims. However, allowing a
state's officials to be called before a federal
court by one of the state's own agencies,
without notice or consent, cannot be
reconciled with the separate sovereignty of
the states. And expanding Exparte Young to
permit a suit in these circumstances cannot
be reconciled with the "real limitation[s]" of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
judgment of the district court is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded with
directions to dismiss it.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
"The 2010 Term, the Spending Clause,
and State Sovereign Immunity"
Balkinization
June 21, 2010
Steve Vladeck
Understandably lost in the other news
coming out of the Supreme Court this
morning was its decision to grant certiorari
in Virginia Office for Protection &
Advocacy v. Reinhard, a case coming out of
the Fourth Circuit. Specifically, Reinhard
raises whether state-created agencies
(created to enforce the state's compliance
with a particular federal statute in exchange
for federal funds) are allowed to invoke the
Ex parte Young "exception" to the Eleventh
Amendment in suits against states for
prospective relief. The Fourth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Wilkinson, held that they
could not. [Full disclosure: I co-authored an
amicus brief in support of certiorari in
Reinhard.]
As I've noted previously, the grant in
Reinhard was all-but foreordained. Even if
it wasn't enough that the SG (whose views
the Court solicited) recommended the grant,
the Seventh Circuit effectively sealed the
deal in late April, when, sitting en banc, it
unanimously disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit's analysis, holding in a closely
analogous case that there was no reason why
the identity of the plaintiffs should matter
under Ex parte Young.
Whatever one's views of the merits of this
issue, Reinhard is now the second major
state sovereign immunity case on the
Court's docket for the 2010 Term; last
month, the Court granted certiorari in
Sossamon v. Texas, which raises whether the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) validly subjects
states (and state officials in both their
official and individual capacities) to
damages liability. The argument there is not
that RLUIPA abrogates the state's sovereign
immunity, but rather that states, in accepting
funds under RLUIPA, are voluntarily
waiving their sovereign immunity.
Together, then, Reinhard and Sossamon
may well make the 2010 Term the
bellwether for the Roberts Court when it
comes to either following or retreating from
the Rehnquist Court in one of the latter's
more controversial areas of jurisprudence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's last significant
decision in this area was one of the last
cases in which Justice O'Connor
participated-Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz in 2006. There, a 5-4 Court
(with O'Connor surprisingly in the majority)
held that Congress could abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, even though
the entire foundation of the Seminole Tribe
line of cases was that Congress could only
subject non-consenting states to suit
pursuant to the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction amendments (and not
pursuant to any of its Article I powers-
including, one would think, the Bankruptcy
Clause). One may well suspect that Justice
Alito does not hold his predecessor's views
on this issue (or, at least, her latest views as
manifested in Katz), but, in four Terms, the
issue has yet to squarely arise (assuming one
doesn't count Chief Justice Roberts's dissent
earlier this month in Alabama v. North
Carolina).
It is definitely worth debating these issues
on the merits, especially in the unique
context of the Spending Clause, where, in
my view, there is a fairly strong argument
that (so long as the regulation survives South
Dakota v. Dole), the states really are
voluntarily waiving their immunity. But for
the moment, and for those who can't wait to
look forward to the Court's upcoming Term
(perhaps as a distraction from what's likely
to come in the next 10 days), it seemed
worth noting the atmospherics, too. I suspect
that it's still too early to decide whether the
Roberts Court is as deeply committed to
federalism as its predecessors, but if these
cases are any guide (Sossamon, especially),
we should know a lot more by this time next
year.
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"VOPA V.Reinhard and Ex parte Young: Why Cert.
Should (and Will) Be Granted"
PrawfsBlawg
May 20, 2010
Steve Vladeck
For Federal Courts fans, one of the more
intriguing cases in which a cert. petition is
currently pending is a little-noticed lawsuit
out of the Fourth Circuit, Virginia Office of
Protection & Advocacy v. Reinhard. In
Reinhard, the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion
by Judge Wilkinson, held that state-created
public agencies are not entitled to invoke the
Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity in suits against state
officials in their official capacities-that
sovereign immunity in general precludes the
federal courts from resolving such
"intramural" conflicts, even those arising
under federal law.
To be blunt, such a conclusion is rather
inconsistent with the doctrine of Ex parte
Young (which has never looked to the
identity of the plaintiff, but has instead
turned on what Justice Scalia described in
2002 as "a straightforward inquiry into
whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief
properly characterized as prospective.").
More than just a problematic application of
Ex parte Young, though, such analysis could
also open the door for courts to identify
additional previously unrecognized
requirements for Young actions. With those
concerns in mind, Reinhard first
unsuccessfully sought rehearing en banc
(with the support of the United States as
amicus curiae), before filing a petition for
certiorari. [Full disclosure: I co-authored an
amicus brief on behalf of a group of federal
courts scholars in support of certiorari.]
Rather than dispose of the cert. petition, the
Court called in January for the views of the
SG as to whether cert. should be granted.
This maneuver was particularly curious at
the time, since the Government had already
taken a position in this case-arguing in
favor of rehearing en bane in the Court of
Appeals. Thus, whether or not the Court
would be swayed by the SG's view as to
cert., it seemed rather clear what that view
would be.
But, although the government has yet to
share its views, a little-noticed development
three weeks ago probably sealed the deal:
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc in
Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services v.
Indiana Family & Social Services Admin.,
expressly disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit's analysis. Although Judge
Easterbrook dissented from other parts of
the opinion (which was otherwise 8-1), the
Seventh Circuit was unanimous in
concluding that state-created agencies may,
in fact, invoke Ex parte Young against their
own state's officers, especially to enforce
the statute at issue in these cases-the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals
With Mental Illness (PAIMI) Act. Indeed, as
Judge Hamilton explained,
Indiana's use of IPAS's status as an
independent state agency to support
the State's late reliance on the
Eleventh Amendment to block this
lawsuit also seems, frankly, unfair.
Congress gave each state the choice
to establish a protection and
advocacy system as either an
independent state agency or a private
not-for-profit entity. Indiana made
the choice to set up IPAS as an
independent state agency. If we gave
that choice any weight in the
Eleventh Amendment inquiry, we
would be permitting Indiana to use
its own choice to set up an
independent state agency as a means
to shield its state hospitals and
institutions from the very
investigatory and oversight powers
that Congress funded to protect some
of the state's most vulnerable
citizens. That result would be strange
indeed. The combination, moreover,
of the state's choice to set up an
independent agency and its failure to
raise the Eleventh Amendment issue
itself also makes it difficult to see
how this lawsuit poses a serious
threat to any special sovereignty
interest of the state.
Whatever the merits, then, there is now a
clear and sharp circuit split on a potentially
significant-but usefully narrow-question
concerning the scope of Ex parte Young
remedies. Moreover, the split is among
judges whose views tend to receive
particular attention on the Court-Posner
and Easterbrook in support of the Seventh
Circuit's analysis (Posner penned a separate
concurrence); Wilkinson in the other
direction. Finally, the Supreme Court has
not really taken a significant state sovereign
immunity case since Justice O'Connor's
parting gift in Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz in 2006. It will be interesting
to see whether the three new Justices (and
by then, perhaps four) have views that
materially differ from their predecessors. [In
2006, then-Judge Sotomayor wrote an
opinion for the Second Circuit closely
resembling the Seventh Circuit's analysis in
IPAS.]
One last thought: Because the SG's office
no doubt authorized the government's
amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit, it's
entirely possible that, if confirmed, then-
Justice Kagan would recuse. I still don't
think that hurts the chances for cert., though.
After all, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
repeatedly written in favor of the traditional
understanding of Exparte Young, and, of the
current Justices, only Justice Kennedy seems
more positively disposed toward Judge
Wilkinson's approach.
All of this is a long way of saying that I
suspect there will be some fun and serious
heavy lifting later this year on the
continuing meaning, relevance, and force of
Ex parte Young. Future Federal Courts
students, beware!
"Constitutional - State Agency Dispute - Sovereign
Immunity - Mental Health Agency - Peer
Review Records"
Virginia Lawyers Weekly
June 8, 2009
Deborah Elkins
A Virginia state advocacy agency for the
mentally disabled cannot sue other state
officials for alleged violations of federal
statutes in denying plaintiff agency access to
"peer review" records related to three
persons who died or were injured in state
facilities for the mentally ill; the 4th Circuit
reverses the district court and says sovereign
immunity bars this suit and a federal court
cannot look to Ex parte Young to decide this
kind of "intramural state dispute."
VOPA is an "independent state agency" in
Virginia that protects and advocates for the
rights of persons with mental illnesses and
developmental disabilities. VOPA brought
suit in federal court against three Virginia
officials in their official capacities, claiming
that Virginia is denying VOPA access to
certain records in violation of the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (DD) and the
Protection & Advocacy for Individuals with
Mental Illness Act (PAIMI). In particular,
VOPA seeks access to "peer review" records
relating to three persons who died or were
injured in facilities for the mentally ill. The
facilities in question are operated by another
state agency, the Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation & Substance
Abuse Services. The defendants are three
officials in that department, named in their
official capacities.
The district court denied the state officials'
motion to dismiss, holding that VOPA had
stated a claim that the state officials were
violating federal law and that the state
officials' argument based on peer review
privilege was inappropriate for resolution of
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it was an
affirmative defense to the merits. The
district court also held that sovereign
immunity did not bar VOPA's suit.
The district court agreed with the state
officials that Congress had not abrogated
Virginia's sovereign immunity, nor had
Virginia waived its sovereign immunity
against this action. However, the court
agreed with VOPA that this suit satisfied the
sovereign immunity exception of Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S.123 (1908), because VOPA
had sued the state officials for prospective
relief from an ongoing violation of federal
law. The district court rejected the state
officials' argument that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young did not permit a suit in federal
court by one state agency against officials of
another agency of the same state.
We hold that sovereign immunity
bars VOPA's suit. While Congress
could seek to provide a federal forum
for this action through its abrogation
power or by requiring a waiver of the
states' sovereign immunity in
exchange for federal funds, Congress
has attempted neither of those
options here. And we decline to
expand the doctrine of Ex parte
Young to lift the bar of sovereign
immunity in federal court when the
plaintiff is a state agency. VOPA
may pursue its claims in state court,
but it would be inconsistent with our
system of dual sovereignty for a
federal court to rely on Ex parte
Young to adjudicate an intramural
state dispute like this one.
We reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand this case
with directions to dismiss it.
Reversed and remanded.
"New State Sovereignty Plea"
SCOTUSblog
May 28, 2010
Lyle Denniston
One week after the federal government
urged the Supreme Court to resolve a split in
lower courts over who can sue state officials
to get them to obey a federal law protecting
mentally ill patients from neglect and abuse,
Indiana officials asked the Supreme Court to
block a lower court ruling exposing them to
a new lawsuit on the same issue. In a new
application (09A1 156) filed Thursday, the
officials noted that they, too, are trying to
head off being sued by another arm of the
Indiana state government to get access to
records of state institutions.
The Court already has before it the case of
Virginia Office for Protection and
Advocacy v. Reinhard (09-529), and last
week got the response it had requested from
the Justice Department on whether to take
on the right-to-sue issue in that case. Acting
Solicitor General Neal K. Katyal urged the
Court to grant review, noting that the Fourth
Circuit Court in the Virginia case had
blocked one state agency from suing other
state officials over access to records of
mental patients, while the Seventh Circuit
Court had allowed just that kind of lawsuit
to go forward in an Indiana case. It was in
the Indiana case that arrived this week as a
challenge to the Seventh Circuit-Indiana
Family and Social Services Administration
v. Indiana Protection and Advocacy
Services.
Since 1975, Congress has been providing
funds to states to use for systems of
advocacy to protect individuals with
disabilities or mental illness from abuse or
neglect. Laws passed in 1975, 1986 and
2000 have followed the principle that states
must promote advocacy of the rights of the
disabled and mentally ill when they are in
state facilities. In the Virginia and Indiana
cases, states created such advocacy
organizations within state government.
Those groups are now carrying on
investigations incidents of abuse or neglect
in state-run facilities, and are seeking
medical records about patients.
The Fourth Circuit barred the Virginia
advocacy group's lawsuit against state
officials, saying that the case implicated
"special sovereign interests." because the
lawsuit was essentially an "intramural
contest" between the state's own officials
and agencies. That argument, however, was
rejected in the Seventh Circuit in the Indiana
case, saying the key issue on whether state
officials could be sued depended upon the
identity of the officials being sued and the
nature of the claim against them, not the
identity of who was suing.
The Solicitor General sided with the Seventh
Circuit's view, saying that, when a state
advocacy organization sues under the
federal laws protecting the disabled and
mentally ill, and seeks a court order to
assure access to records of such patients, it
is "implementing federal law and policy,
intramural state political dispute."
The Indiana officials, in their filing on
Thursday, sided with the Fourth Circuit's
view. The state advocacy group's lawsuit
against other state officials, the application
asserted, implicates the state's "special
sovereignty interests." They argued: "There
is at least a reasonable possibility that either
[Indiana officials] or their Virginia
counterparts... will persuade the Court that
sovereign immunity preludes this federal
court action." Thus, they asked the Supreme
Court to order the Seventh Circuit in the
Indiana case to put its ruling on hold, so that
the lawsuit does not proceed until the
Supreme Court has settled the dispute
among the Circuit Courts.
Now that the Justices have the Solicitor
General's views urging them to hear the
Virginia case, they are expected to decide
shortly whether to grant review. The
Solicitor General's view is not binding on
the Court, however.
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